THE U.S. ARMY AND VIETNAM: THE BEGINNING
Some would argue that "the U.S. Army lost the Vietnam war before the first field formations set foot in that country." One argument is that in 1965 'the U.S. Army was unprepared and unable to meet the challenges imposed by the Vietnam War.' Andrew Krepinevich’s The Army and Vietnam is a critique of the U.S. Army and strategic/operational leadership during the conflict in Vietnam (1959-1973). Krepinivich lays claim that the senior leaders and commanders of the U.S. Army approached the conflict in Vietnam in an inflexible, European Theater style ‘force-on-force’ strategy that conscientiously ignored ‘counter-insurgency’ techniques and would tactically, rely on maximum combined arms firepower to destroy the Viet Cong insurgency and the North Vietnamese Army. The Army and Vietnam draws from the experiences of the U.S. Army during World War II and Korea. Krepinevich presents details of the thinking of senior leaders between WWII and Korea as well as after the Korean