“AUFTRAGSTAKTIK" - Mission Type Orders and The Heer

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Introduction to Basic WWII German Army Doctrine

 Staff officers quick huddle and map check.

Max Hastings, British historian and journalist, said in a radio interview on WGN Chicago …

            “...there's no doubt that man for man, the German army was the greatest fighting force of the Second World War”.

And author Chris Evans:

            “The German soldier was very professional and well trained, aggressive in attack and stubborn in defence. He was always adaptable, particularly in the later years when shortages of equipment were being felt.”


Analysis by the US Army of the 1939 German Campaign in Poland found that "The emphasis which the Germans placed on the development of leadership and initiative in commanders during years of preparatory training brought its rewards in the Polish campaign.


With confidence that these principles had been properly inculcated, all commanders, from the highest to the lowest echelons, felt free to carry out their missions or meet changes in situations with a minimum of interference by higher commanders."

They recognized that "initiative, flexibility and mobility" were the essential aspects of German tactics

What made the German Army, the Heer, different from the Allies Armies? Was it simply equipment? Or General officer leadership? Or was it doctrine combined with training that reinforced initiative.

 

AUFTRAGSTAKTIK: MISSION TYPE ORDERS OR “MISSION COMMAND”

Truppenführung: The 1933-34 German Army Field Manual: Handling of Combined-Arms Formations  ie …an Intellectual Tool!

Training, multi-echelon training, combined arms training, cross training, discipline, the will to win and…

 ‘a very professional NCO Corps, and a very well educated and dedicated STAFF…practitioners of the Operational Art.’


NCO throwing a "stick grenade" in France 1940.
                            

MISSION TYPE ORDERS (MISSION COMMAND)

In mission-type tactics, the military commander gives subordinate leaders a clearly defined goal (the mission), the forces needed to accomplish that goal and a time frame within which the goal must be reached.

The subordinate leaders then implement the order independently. The subordinate leader is given, to a large extent, the planning initiative and a freedom in execution which allows a high degree of flexibility at the Operational and Tactical levels of command.

Mission-type Orders free the higher leadership from tactical details.

For the success of the mission-type tactics it is especially important that the subordinate leaders understand the intent of the orders and are given proper guidance and that they are trained so they can act independently.

The success of the doctrine rests upon the recipient of orders understanding the intent of the issuer and acting to achieve the goal even if their actions violate other guidance or orders they have received.

 Clearly, taking the risks of violating other previously expressed limitations as a routine step to achieving a mission is a behavior most easily sustained in a particular type of innovative culture.

 That culture is today often associated with elite units and not a whole army.

 
Early mark "Panzerkampfwagen" tanks in Poland 1939.


CHARACTERISTICS

The success of the doctrine rests upon the recipient of orders understanding the intent of whoever issues the orders and acting to achieve the goal even if their actions violate other guidance or orders they have received.

Mission-type tactics assume the possibility of violating other, previously expressed limitations as a step to achieving a mission and are a concept most easily sustained in a decentralized command culture.

This is quite alien to any organization in which, at every level, a subordinate commander is only expected (and, therefore, trained) to follow detailed orders.

 

IMPLICATION

This has significant implications for any army considering the adoption of Auftragstaktik.

To clarify, the classic approach called for every commander to be trained to function effectively at two levels of command above his appointment:

-         Platoon Leaders should be able to handle a Battalion

-         Company Commanders should be able to handle a Brigade

-         Battalion Commanders should be able to handle a Combined Arms Battle Group or Corps


DOCTRINE

Doctrine is the conceptual underpinning of HOW to think and operate effectively; teaching leaders WHAT to think is dogma; doctrine is thus a framework to ensure common understanding and is the basis of training in armies.


Mid-mark Panzerkampfwagen in Russia, September 1942.


Auftragstaktik can be seen as a doctrine within which formal rules can be selectively suspended in order to overcome "friction". Carl von Clausewitz stated that "Everything in war is very simple but the simplest thing is difficult". Problems will occur with misplaced communications, troops going to the wrong location, delays caused by weather, etc., and it is the duty of the commander to do his best to overcome them.

Auftragstaktik encourages commanders to exhibit initiative, flexibility and improvisation while in command. In what may be seen as surprising to some, Auftragstaktik empowers commanders to disobey orders and revise their effect as long as the intent of the commander is maintained.

Across NATO and especially within the US Armed Forces (U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps) 'Mission Command' is taught, debated, explored, and practiced. Given the especially strong NCO Corps of the Army and Marine Corps, and the character of the American Soldier or Marine, Mission Command has found adherents in contemporary operations and will for some time.

 

 

 

 

RESOURCES

Condell, Bruce and Zabecki, Ed., On the German Art of War: Truppenführung-German Army Manual for Unit Command in World War II, Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books for Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2009.

 

Directives for the Treatment of Political Commissars [Commissar Order] (June 6, 1941), U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, Nuremberg Trial, National Archives Record Group 238m, Entry 175, Box 27, NOKW-1076.

 

Source of original German text: Richtlinien für die Behandlung  politischer Kommissare  [Kommissarbefehl] (6. Juni 1941), U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, Nuremberg Trial, National Archives Record Group 238m, Entry 175, Box 27, NOKW1076, Volume 7. Nazi Germany, 1933-1945

 

Directives for the Treatment of Political Commissars (“Commissar Order”) (June 6, 1941)

https://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/English58.pdf.

 

PHOTOGRAPHS

Bundesarchiv Bild CC BY-SA 4.0, Soviet Union – German motorized unit of the SS Totenkopf-Division.

 

“German tanks during Operation Barbarossa”, February 8, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/event/Operation-Barbarossa#/media/1/52772/157184.

 

Miller, Jacob, ’32 Photographs of Hitler’s Operation Barbarossa,’ History Collection, 12 July 2017,

https://historycollection.com/32-photographs-hitlers-operation-barbarossa/.

 

 

 


















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