"CONVENTIONAL COMMANDERS IN AN UNCONVENTIONAL WAR: THE U.S. ARMY IN VIETNAM 1965-1967"

INTRODUCTION

             Between 1965 and 1968 the majority of the Infantry Brigade and Battalion commanders fighting in Vietnam were veterans of the Second World War and/or the Korean war. Who were these  WWII veterans who led the U.S. Army in Vietnam and, as a group, how did they interpret their assigned tasks during the first two years of America’s involvement in Vietnam. This study illustrates how the ‘first wave’ of maneuver commanders, of whom a majority were veterans of the Second World War or Korea, adapted to myriad of conditions they faced across the 44 provinces in the Republic of Vietnam.

 Within the historiography of the U.S. Army in Vietnam, the secondary literature concentrates on the strategy developed and implemented by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and the ‘search and destroy’ operations executed across the country. A small group of scholars have argued that without any clear method through which to measure success, the commanders pursued ‘body counts’ of enemy dead via search and destroy operations. 

The military historians of the Vietnam war have focused on strategy, the key leaders: Generals Westmoreland and Abrams, or the operations and organizations that participated in the conflict. “Conventional Commanders in an Unconventional War” will challenge the well-developed historiography of the Vietnam war by addressing the organization, culture, and  pre-Vietnam experiences of the U.S Army and the commanders who were charged with prosecuting the war. Often overlooked, the commanders spread out across the 44 provinces in South Vietnam prosecuted a war effort with their intimate experiences of combat during the Second World War and Korea as a guiderail.

Two major themes have appeared within revisionist and post-revisionist quarters. The first theme that gained prominence in the 1980s is one where General Westmoreland adopted the strategy of attrition and paid little attention to the civil-military pacification effort. Doing so cost the U.S. Army time and lives. Follow on arguments then proposed that Westmoreland’s replacement, General Creighton Abrams, changed the strategy, re-oriented the U.S. Army and saw significant improvement in both the U.S. Army and the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam).

This, then, is the ‘better war’ theme (via a 'better General'). Newer post-revisionist arguments have however, specifically argued against the better general theme. New arguments are suggesting that General Westmoreland did concern himself and his MACV staff with pacification, the development of the capacity of the ARVN, and reorienting U.S. Divisions, Brigades, and Battalions to simultaneously approach the kinetic, or ‘search and destroy’ operations with the non-kinetic or pacification and general counterinsurgency. The truth is possibly a combination of both themes; that both Generals Westmoreland and Abrams understood they had to simultaneously wage a kinetic and non-kinetic campaign against a seasoned, adapting, and fully committed enemy. They had to do so with the WWII and Korean war veteran Battalion and Brigade commanders they had between 1965 and 1967.

A lacuna exists in the historiography of the Vietnam War’s military history. Specifically, research is lacking on the unit commanders as a collective body exercising free agency while charged with tasks, missions, and directives from a centralized headquarters (MACV). Studies have explored, for example, the 1966 West Point Class as it embarked into combat in Vietnam. The 1966 West Point Class, however, were junior officer who served as Platoon leaders and Rifle Company Commanders. The Battalion and Brigade commanders, as a group, have not been fully researched with respect to the war and the strategy they were charged with implementing. Further, the initial group of unit level commanders were charged with implementing a strategy between 1965 and 1967 which was the most important period during the 10-year conflict as it set the tone for the rest of the war.

 

 STUDY SIGNIFICANCE

            “Conventional Commanders in an Unconventional War” seeks to move forward the historiography specifically ‘from the bottom up.’ As the majority of the historiography has addressed the strategy implemented within Vietnam, the national security ministerial level decisions and the larger regional and global diplomatic history, research  will concentrate on the executors; i.e. the unit level commanders who were charged with implementing the strategy and who came face-to-face with the hard reality and challenges of doing so.

             The purpose of this study is to investigate the battalion and brigade maneuver commanders: what was expected of them, how were they trained, what previous experiences they brought to Vietnam, and how they implemented the directives and plans from Division through Corps, Field Force, and MACV Headquarters. MACV developed and directed the overall strategy but it was the maneuver commander’s actions that would yield success or failure in Vietnam.

 Anticipated results of the research include details that further inform the history of the Vietnam war and expands the understanding holistically.  Professors Daddis and Moyar have seriously refreshed the debates on the Vietnam war and have challenged the orthodoxy (Halberstam, Karnow, Sheehan) and have disputed some of the revisionist concepts as espoused by Dr. Bob Sorley, Krepinevich, Boot, and others. “Conventional Commanders in an Unconventional War” seeks to enjoin in the debate and add to the post-revisionist scholarship with an approach that adds to the body of work.

RESEARCH METHOD

             Classic historical research method will be employed concentrating on document research at multiple archives. Fortunately, material on the Vietnam war and specifically, from within the U.S. Army, is robust. Further, a generous amount has been digitized at the various repositories. However, several field trips are required to assess the unit-level non-digitized records.

             Archives and repositories include the following:

                        U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Archives

The U.S. Army Center for Military History, The Vietnam War,  Archives

United States Department of State, Archives

Central Intelligence Agency, Archives, Office of the Historian

Texas Tech University, The Vietnam Center and the Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive

The National Archives

Rutgers Oral History Archives, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey

 

Several research trips are planned including Texas Tech University Sam Johnson Vietnam Archives in Lubbock, TX, The U.S. Army War College Archives at Carlisle Barracks, PA, the U.S. Army Center for Military History at FT. McNair, Washington D.C.  Lastly, a potential trip to Vietnam may be undertaken to Vietnam in early 2023.

QUALIFICATIONS

As a retired (2021) Command Sergeant Major/E9 with a total of 38 years of combined service in the United States Marine Corps, the United States Army and the Army National Guard (Active), my experiences at the tactical and operational level have provided me some unique opportunities, insight, and education. I was a Senior Infantry Non-Commissioned Officer with both, peacekeeping and combat deployments, in Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan. I labored through the ranks and various courses (Professional Military Education) and served as a Rifle Squad Leader, Rifle Platoon Sergeant, and Company First Sergeant of a Rifle Company and a Headquarters Company.

I also served as a Brigade Operations Sergeant Major (two different Brigades) and as a Non-Commissioned Officer Academy(Regional Training Institute) Commandant.  These experiences will serve me well as I explore topics across military history and national security, and strategic policy.

Academically, my previous professors provided me with some fundamental tools in approaching research, the value of primary sources, oral interviews, solid planning, editing, and most importantly, reaching out across the academy for assistance.

My Undergraduate course work culminated in a deep exploration of U.S. Army doctrine; specifically the FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency Field Manual. I conducted oral interviews and surveyed over 250 Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers who were veterans of either Iraq, Afghanistan or both.

My Graduate studies led me to explore the Royal Air Force and Bomber Command during the Second World War. This opportunity afforded me the experience of reaching out to international academics and gaining knowlegde in UK archives from National Archives and the Imperial War Museum collections.

I look forward to deep research at The U.S. Army Center for Military History, the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle Barracks, PA and interacting with the Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Archive at Texas Tech University to name a few.