“U.S. MARINE CORPS PRE-WAR TRAINING AND THE BATTLE OF BELLEAU WOOD: 1917-1918”

I: Introduction

                The fighting in Belleau Wood, France, in  June, 1918 saw the command of the U.S. Marine 6th Machine Gun Battalion change hands four times in 11 days. Such was the nature of the vicious fight between the 4th Marine Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division (U.S. Army) and the Germans pushing towards Paris. By all accounts, this first real test of the U.S Marines in the First World War, was a bloodletting that should have ended in a rout as the experienced and veteran German machine gunners tore into the inexperienced U.S. Marines. Rather than collapse, the 4th Marine Brigade withstood the German assaults and not only held firm, but triumphed. The U.S. Marine Corps 5th and 6th Marine Regiments in 1918 fought against the veteran and very experienced German infantry. This study seeks to identify how ad hoc Marine Corps infantry battalions and the newly formed 4th Marine Brigade was able to not only stop the German advance, but ultimately prevail, over a much more experienced enemy in an environment such as the industrialized battlefield of northern France in World War 1.

                1,032 U.S. Marines died in 31 days of constant fighting in the month of June, 1918. A further 3,615 Marines were wounded in that same action. June 1918 was the costliest month in the entire history of the United States Marine Corps. Belleau Wood, an old hunting preserve,  is a small wood surrounded by wheat fields that lays 50 miles from Paris proper. The Battle of Belleau Wood (Bois de Belleau) was the first serious action of the United States Marine Corps in the First World War. Two regiments, the 5th and the 6th Marines, engaged the German Army and saw close quarters fighting, the use of bayonet, artillery, machine guns, mustard gas, and air attacks. Of all the weapons employed by the U.S. Marines, the most fundamental was employed with incredible accuracy; the rifle.

                The First World War, by 1918, had already seen millions killed and maimed in what proved to be the first industrial sized war. The United States, under President Woodrow Wilson, had remained a neutral but sympathetic party to the conflict that consumed so many across Europe. Unrestricted German submarine warfare across the Atlantic would eventually compel the United States and Wilson to enter the war in April of 1917. The declaration of war, by the United States forced a general mobilization and draft of recruits across the United States. Three months after the declaration of war by the United States, the U.S. Army established the ‘American Expeditionary Force’ under General John J. Pershing for service in Europe.

                Of the 40+ Infantry Divisions[1] to be established, including active, new, and National Guard Divisions, the Second Infantry Division was assembled with one Brigade from the U.S. Army and another Brigade, from the United States Marine Corps. The Division, quickly assembled from units across the Army and the Marine Corps, would be rushed into action in northern France. General Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), was not at all inclined to incorporate the U.S. Marine regiments in his combat divisions.  His initial instinct was to assign the Marines stevedore and port guard duties. At issue was the unknown entity that the Marines represented to the U.S. Army. Pershing was busy of course, attempting to orchestrate the largest mobilization of manpower in U.S. Army history. Pershing cabled the War Department “stating that “he found the 5th Marine Regiment indigestible and asked that no more Marines be sent to France.”[2] The Secretary of War overruled Pershing and would see to it that a Marine Brigade would participate alongside the U.S. Army in the Great War in Europe.

                Official history of the U.S. Army states that the average soldier received six months of training prior to seeing action in the trenches across France. Some regiments and battalions were never committed to the savage fighting in the closing months of 1918. The average battalion, however, once deployed to France, would typically be inserted into a quiet sector with French or British units. This process would expose the platoons and companies to the realities of the front but in a manner that was methodical, deliberate, and mitigating of the numerous risks associated with front-line service. This initial exposure was normally a few weeks to a month or two but not more. It was the German spring offensive in 1918 that would impose an urgency across the French and AEF high commands that would require the first American regiments and battalions to engage in combat.

                The 4th Marine Brigade was rushed outside Château-Thierry where they would engage the Germans for the first time and without either British or French assistance. Moreover, they would rely on the unique culture of the Marine Corps; their cohesion and discipline. They would also rely on their pre-war training, and follow their seasoned officers and veteran non-commissioned officers into the crucible of combat and overcome the german infantry; a very seasoned and determined foe.

                The Battle of Belleau Wood has been studied and reassessed over the years with a particular emphasis on the details of the fight, the chronological order of the events as they unfolded in space in time, and on the decisions of the key leaders within the 2nd Infantry Division, the 4th Marine Brigade, and the 5th and 6th Marine Regiments. The historiography is constantly refreshed owing to the myths and lore associated and recycled by each generation of U.S. Marine. Contemporary historiography has scrutinized the attack through the wheat fields, the hastily prepared set of orders pushed down from Brigade to the 5th and 6th Marine Regiments, and the difficulty with logistics resupply, often a neglected aspect of the planning in the first actions of the AEF in World War 1.

II: The Culture of the Corps

            The U.S. Marine Corps was ‘born’ on 10 November, 1775, within the halls of a drinking establishment in Philadelphia. “Tun Tavern” was a brewery and a bar; a meeting place in the 1770s that is traditionally regarded as the first recruiting station of the United States Marine Corps. As a part of the ‘Naval service,’ Marines are soldiers of the sea; comfortable on land and shipboard. A unique service, the Marine Corps is historically, small in numbers. Pre-World War 1 strength was never greater than 13,000 Marines. As a ‘landing party,’ Marines were organized to carry out raids, small sharp, short actions and more often, they found themselves acting as a constabulary or protecting embassies and consulates.

            The Marine Corp, however, had earned a reputation within the armed forces owing to their near constant use in overseas expeditions. Most Marines served overseas or aboard Naval vessels. They operated with a degree of independence and  junior officers exercised authority and responsibility beyond their stateside peers. The Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) or sergeants, ran the day-to-day routine of enlisted Marines. Owing to their long service and years overseas, the NCOs were grizzled veterans who enforced standards and discipline. From the Revolutionary war to the Philippines, Mexico, Cuba, and China, the Marine NCOs in 1917 influenced the culture of the rapidly expanding Marine Corps. The fruits of their labor would be demonstrated in 1918 France.

            Many young American men had to decide whether to enlist in the U.S. Army or the United States Marine Corps.  Marine Corps recruiters often highlighted the ‘overseas duty’ coupled with adventure and “splendid opportunities.”[3] The Corps sought out unique candidates such as Private T.S. Allen. Originally from South Dakota, and certainly not immune to the hard physical life out west in the early 1900s, Allen remembers that “soldiers looked like husky chaps, but there was something about the Marines you could not forget.”[4] He recalled the Marines he first saw as alert, clean, and minding their own business who left a deep impression. He suspected the Marines could take care of themselves. He enlisted, trained at Parris Island and then Quantico Virginia with the 96th Company, 2nd Battalion, Sixth Marines. He later fought and was wounded at Belleau Wood.

            Perhaps no better example of the unique U.S. Marine Corps culture exists than the recruiting requirements imposed in 1918. The War Department imposed a nationwide draft as part of the mobilization and a tentative plan was submitted via the Navy Department and approved on behalf of the Marine Corps.  While “men were supplied from the selective draft,”  the Marine Corps was granted the authority to accept or reject the inductee’s if they failed to measure up.[5] Once the potential recruit was accepted, depending on where they lived (U.S. West Coast or U.S. East Coast) they reported to Mare Island in San Francisco or Parris Island, South Carolina.

            The shaping and training of recruits for service in France began, for most recruits, at Parris Island, South Carolina. The Recruit Depot at Parris Island, formerly known as Port Royal, S.C., ramped up upon general mobilization and trained over 13,000 Marines during 1918. Recruits received their introduction to the Marine Corps and an eight-week basic training course to prepare them for the war in France. The training included the usual physical fitness, close order drill and marching, swimming, bayonet fighting, and obstacle courses.[6] The most important aspect of the training syllabus was the three weeks spent on the rifle range. The Marine Corps particularly paid attention to advanced marksmanship which would pay dividends in France.

             A U.S. Marine veteran of northern France and Belleau Wood, Elton Mackin, provides some interesting insight on training at  Parris Island. “Americans say among themselves - feel among themselves - there’s two things the American man can do, he can shoot straight and play poker, and some play a pretty good game of poker and most all of them can shoot.”[7]

            The Marine Corps during the pre-war period (1898-1917) obsessed over ‘close order drill,’ the manual of arms, and strict control of subordinate formations. The doctrine of the era inculcated the junior Marines with unquestioning obedience and exacting discipline.[8] The idea espoused in the pre-war era concentrated on gaining ‘fire superiority which allows for maneuver, closing with the enemy, and engaging with bayonet.’ As such, discipline and adherence to superior officer’s orders and commands was necessary in order to maintain effective control of subordinates.

            Marine Corps regulations up to 1917 prohibited owning civilian attire and disallowed the carry of knives aboard Naval vessels. Uniform care, wear, and their appearance was given specific attention. Everything about the pre-war Marine was a deliberate manipulation of standards, conduct, and training to reinforce obedience and strict discipline.

            Obedience to orders was a necessity when a Rifle Company of 250 men, for example, was formed up. Four rows of men, spaced out 5 yards between men, typically advanced at a set pace in order to close with a final advance by bayonet. While this was the preferred manner of employment in the Philippines, or Cuba and the Dominican Republic, it would not hold whatsoever in the modern battlefields of France in 1918. Belleau Wood, as shall be seen, would change the doctrine, close order drill, and centralized control of formations.

 

III: Pre-World War 1 Period: 1898-1917

            The history of the Marine Corps, prior to 1914, was a history of small expeditions, remote duty and limited combat for Marine detachments. On April 1st, 1917, the entire U.S. Marine Corps end strength was 13,725 personnel. By late 1918, the Marine Corps grew to over 75,000 men. Before World War I, the Marine Corps, like the Army, “organized itself into regiments but, unlike the Army, the Corps did not have a fixed structure below the regiment level.”[9]

            The nature of the Naval service required the use of small Marine detachments that served on capital ships (typically battleships and gun cruisers), that provided security, enforced discipline, and on occasion, served as small landing parties. Additionally, U.S. Marine detachments served as ‘constabulary’ forces in order to protect U.S. legations, embassies, or in anti-guerilla operations while representing U.S. interests abroad. Such was the case of the U.S. Marine Corps between 1898 and 1917.

            With Europe engaged in war between 1914 through 1917, the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps busied themselves studying and preparing. Although they did not possess the combined arms experience of the French or British armies, the active officers and NCOs were seasoned and professional.  In the case of the U.S. Marine Corps regiments, they arrived in Europe with a solid corps of veteran Non-Commissioned Officers, who on average, had years of experience. The most senior NCOs in the Rifle Companies and Battalion staffs had served in the Spanish-American War (1898) or in the Boxer Rebellion in China (1898-1901).

            The U.S. Marine Corps contributed over 2,055 Marines to the Spanish-American War  with 600+ conducting a landing and engaging in ground combat in Cuba.[10] Marines landed in Cavite, Philippines with Admiral Dewey’s squadron and would land unopposed in the capture of Guam. While none of these actions  can compare to a three-day period in northern France, these actions often required preparations, tactical and logistics planning, and key actions of NCOs such as rehearsal, inspections, task organization for critical tasks and the like.

            The Marine Corps spent the post-Spanish American war period (early 1900s), reinforcing or supporting American foreign policy interests across the Pacific and the Caribbean.  After the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898, the U.S. Army and one Battalion of U.S. Marines established themselves in the Philippines. Over the course of 24 months, the U.S. Army engaged guerillas across Luzon, Philippines and the U.S. Marine Corps established the 1st Marine Regiment in Cavite. While the Marines protected the Naval port of Subic Bay, they routinely supported the Army against guerillas. The 1st Marine Regiment, additionally, deployed Marines to legations and American interests in Korea, Peking (Beijing), and Shanghai.  The Marine Corps in the Pacific maintained a foot print in some capacity right through the Second World War.

            The Caribbean also saw tremendous employment and small unit action by Marine Rifle Companies and small battalions.  In 1910 U.S. Marine Corps Major Smedley D. Butler arrived off the coast of Nicaragua. He commanded over 250 Marines and they would assist in implementing security and protecting American interests in Bluefields. By 1912, the Marines would occupy Nicaragua and operate there until as late as 1933. Nicaragua, along with Haiti, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic all shared issues with political instability that affected U.S. government and economic interests.

            In 1912, 750 Marines were landed in the Dominican Republic.[11] The Marines departed in 1912 only to return in 1916. The Marines would operate as an anti-guerilla and constabulary forces in the Dominican Republic until 1924. By 1915, 330 U.S. Marines landed in Haiti for occupation duty. Over a five-year period, the Marines would engage in anti-guerilla operations, establish base camps, train the Haitian Gendarmerie and fight two different uprisings (the 1st and 2nd Caco Wars).  

            The Spanish-American war through 1917 saw the United States Marine Corps engaged across the Pacific and the Caribbean effectively supporting and enforcing U.S. foreign policy interests. The benefit of these ‘expeditionary’ deployments played out in the professionalization of its NCO corps and officer corps. Leadership was developed and routinely practiced as each of the expeditions mandated independence, self-reliance, critical planning skills, and small unit tactics. While all these experiences were eclipsed by the savagery of the industrial-scale fighting in World War 1, lessons were learned that carried the Marines through the tough fighting across northern France.

 IV: Training and Mobilization for War: 1917

            Against General Pershing’s initial desire, the 2nd Infantry Division stood up in October 1917 as  part of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF). The Division was comprised of  with one U.S. Army Brigade and a U.S. Marine Brigade. Both Brigade’s consisted of two Infantry Regiments and one Machine Gun Battalion. The Marine Corps provided the 5th and 6th Marine Regiments along with a machine gun battalion to form up the 4th Marine Brigade.

            The whole of the 2nd Infantry Division was created, ad hoc, and included active U.S. Army Infantry Battalions assembled from battalions stationed along the U.S.-Mexican Border. The Army battalions were transported to Syracuse, New York, and then on to France in 1918.  2nd Division staff understood the necessity for preparations and training and maximized all available time towards that end.[12] The official 2nd Division History remarks that “a program of intensive training was projected, but it was not to go forward” as logistics and competition for resources inhibited fully formed training programs.  The history continues  further, stating that “there were too many things to be done by the Americans in- France, and too few Americans -- yet -- to get them done.”[13]

            The 2nd Division was assembled from active personnel, including its officers and non-commissioned officers. The official history remarks that at no time did the Marine Brigade, for example, during its time in combat and attached to the 2nd Division, did the Brigade ever receive ‘draftees,’[14] The 4th Marine Brigade, then, deployed with Marine veterans of pre-war service. However, much like the 2nd Division, the 5th Marine Regiment, was also hastily assembled from various detachments across the Marine Corps. From ships detachments, stations, and small outposts, the regiment was assembled and immediately shipped off to France. Additionally, the 6th Marine Regiment, also scratch built for wartime service, was assembled at the new Marine Corps base in Quantico, Virginia in July 1917.

            Both, the 5th and 6th Marines were manned, equipped and hurriedly deployed for duty in France. The 5th Marines stood up in mid-June of 1917 and  arrived in France on 27 June, 1917. They were immediately put to work in the ports performing manual labor stevedore, and guard duty. The 6th Marines trained from July until October, when the first elements joined up with the 5th Marine Regiment in France.[15] The Commandant of the Marine Corps purposely selected the best officers from across the Corps to man the new 4th Marine Brigade. To a man, every Company, Battalion, and Regimental commander was a seasoned veteran and “ many of its leaders had extensive experience with the Corps around the world before World War I.”[16]

            The U.S. Army Brigade and the 4th Marine Brigade were comprised of active personnel, the officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) were typically long-service veterans who arrived with what experiences and training they had prior to 1918.       In the case of the Army regiments, both had served along the Mexican border conducting patrolling and area security operations. For the Marines, the officers and particularly the NCOs, they brought with them their collective experiences in expeditionary and anti-guerilla operations from the Philippines, Cuba, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. The pre-war period, between the Spanish-American War of 1898 and 1917, saw rapid developments in firearms technology including widespread use of the machine gun (firing automatic links or belts of ammunition) and rifled artillery, which extended its effective range and accuracy.  Infantry formations, nevertheless, relied on the bolt action rifle: the Springfield 1903 coupled with a bayonet.

            At the turn of the century Marine Corps manpower hovered around 13,000 or so personnel. This included officers, NCOs, and junior enlisted rank and file, spread out in small detachments, legations, and naval vessels. As a small organization, the Marine Corps adopted or simply copied many of the U.S. Army regulations and doctrine. An example is found within “The Landing Force and Small Arms Instructions: United States Navy 1916.” Interestingly, this manual was first published in 1905 with a recommendation “to follow the Army in all fighting formations.”[17]

            Further evidence of the Marine Corps use of Army regulations and guidance can be found in the U.S. Army instructions disseminated across the AEF in 1918. “Instructions for the Offensive Combat of Small Units,” published in May 1918, was signed off by General Pershing and oriented towards the conditions the AEF would face in France. It is a sobering manual as it includes elements of intelligence gathered between 1914 and 1917 and conveys the difficult challenges that AEF would come face-to-face with once in France.

            Historically speaking, this manual has much in common with the basic principles of any combined arms formations and the tactics to be employed. Assault, support by fire, ‘rushes’ by smaller groups with covering fire, artillery employment at the point of attack, envelopment, flanking, synchronization and coordination of both, supporting fires and adjacent friendly units with an emphasis on flexibility and mobility.[18]

            Neither regiment, once in France, was afforded much opportunity to train beyond marksmanship, drill, machine gun ranges, bayonet drills and classes in the French model chemical protective mask use. Most of the training concentrated on life in the trenches.[19] Training introduced the Marines to life in the trenches, building dug outs, manning observation posts and reacting to simulated gas and artillery attacks. Physical training included ‘hardening’ or conditioning, through forced marches; hiking with full kit, and in all types of weather.[20] The soldiers and Marines of the newly formed Second Infantry Division, after a period of two to three months, were introduced to the front-lines. They were purposely employed in quiet sectors with accompanying French or British formations to slowly and deliberately acclimate the troops to the conditions of the Western Front.

            A unique aspect of the American culture, it seems, played out in the trenches, fields, and forests of northern France once the U.S. Army and especially, the U.S. Marine Corps arrived in 1918. The deliberate, well-aimed, and precise employment of the rifle was remarked upon by both German and American veterans of the Battle of Belleau Wood. The Marine Corps prioritized rifle marksmanship well before World War 1 service.  Marksmanship coupled with a healthy dose of bayonet training was the main aspect of training for the Marines in the Rifle Companies.[21] Close combat, hand-to-hand, with bayonet, knife, and shovel, the Marines were ruthlessly drilled to parry German bayonet attacks and to counter with deliberate strikes.

            The subordinate Battalions within the 4th Marine Brigade used every available moment to train. The 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines, for example, arrived in France on 12 November 1917. The battalion was immediately put to work across the ports, docks, and warehouses. Two months later, on 12 January 1918, the battalion joined the rest of the 4th Marine Brigade in the Second Division training area at Carbon Blanc. The battalion’s official history remarked that “the training was very severe due both to the strenuous schedule and the winter.” [22]

            The Marines in the 4th Marine Brigade received training in Quantico, Virginia prior to shipping off to France. For the newest Marines, inducted in 1917, they had all received the requisite 8-week basic training program at Parris Island, S.C. or Mare Island, San Francisco. A further month or two at Quantico provided an opportunity to develop cohesion and make basic preparations for combat in France. As has been noted, the 5th and 6th Marine regiments were ad hoc organization’s purpose built for operations in France. While the 5th Marines was working as stevedores in the ports, the 6th Marines was still being organized.[23] Once the orders were approved for the stand-up of the Second Divisions, all the battalions and support companies were assembled in Carbon Blanc. On balance, the Rifle Companies and the platoons had the minimum of training in modern combined arms operations. The seasoned officers and veteran NCOs would carry the battalions through the first actions. From thereafter, it would be the junior Marines who’d carry the battalion al, the way to November 1918.

 

V: The Leadership

            A survey of the prototypical NCO in the Marine Corps in October 1918 had ten or more years of service. Many had served most of their careers overseas in the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, or aboard a U.S. Navy gun-cruiser. Marine Sergeant Kocak and First Sergeant Daly are synonymous with the veteran NCO corps across the 4th Marine Brigade. Sergeant Kocak, an immigrant from Slovakia, was ‘an old hand’ to his new charges in the 5th Marines. Kocak was serving in the Dominican Republic when he was ordered to Quantico to fill out the new 5th Marine Regiment.[24] Kocak led from the front and aggressively engaged the German infantry on numerous occasions in close combat employing bayonet and grenades.  Kocak was killed in action in Blanc Mont Ridge in July 1918. For his actions he was awarded the Medal of Honor.

            First Sergeant Daniel Daly found a home in the Marine Corps and served in China, Haiti, and aboard numerous U.S. Navy vessels. He served in the Marine Corps from 1899 until 1929 and retired as a Sergeant Major. For his action in China during the Boxer Rebellion, he was awarded the Medal of Honor. While in Haiti, his small patrol was ambushed by hundreds of Cacos guerillas. Daly was awarded his second Medal of Honor for actions then. As a First Sergeant of the 73rd Machine Gun Company, Sixth Marines, he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for action in Belleau Wood.[25]

            The officers and especially, the Company and Battalion Commanders, were seasoned veterans who had also served most of their careers overseas. Captain Llyod W. Williams, ‘skipper’ of the 51st Company, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines was commissioned in 1910 and by 1918, had served a year if sea duty on the USS Mississippi, in Panama, Nicaragua, Guam, and Cuba. He was highly rated by his superiors and led his men from the front. He was killed in action on 12 June during the Battle of Belleau Wood. The Marine commissioned many of the its junior officers from the ranks. 2nd Lieutenant Kipness, another immigrant (from Russia) enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1904. Kipness, as an enlisted Marine, served in Panama, Haiti, Mexico and deployed to France as a First Sergeant before commissioning. 

            The 6th Marines Regimental Commander, Colonel Albertus Catlin, wrote of Major Berton Sibley, his subordinate commander of 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines, that he was a ‘picturesque character’ who was ‘thorough in all that he did’ and that ‘his boys followed him and loved him like warriors of old.’[26] Major Sibley led from the front and took over one of his subordinate Rifle Companies, leading it in Belleau Wood when all the company officers were wounded. Sibley was awarded the Navy Cross for his actions at Belleau Wood.

            The Regimental skipper, Colonel Catlin, was an old hand as well. A U.S. Naval Academy graduate, Colonel Catlin led his regiment (the 6th Marines) at Belleau Wood and shared in the stress and hardship of the hard-fought engagement. Colonel Catlin, a veteran of the Spanish-American War, was the Marine Detachment Commander aboard the USS Maine when it exploded off Cuba. Colonel Catlin fought in Vera Cruz, Mexico where he was awarded the Medal of Honor.[27]

            The NCOs and officers that led the 4th Marine Brigade at Belleau Wood were seasoned veterans of expeditionary warfare. As professionals, they understood that their tasks would require tremendous effort and decisive leadership as they would be challenged in the most arduous conditions they had ever experienced. Nevertheless, their seasoning and real-world experiences molded them, as leaders, to set the example, lead from the front, share in the hardship of their subordinates, and mostly, to make sound and steady decisions when in action.

 VI: The Battle of Belleau Wood

            There is a slight, almost gentle rise, from the wheat field to the woods. Even with the wheat high, there is little wonder as to how and why the Marines experienced the mass of casualties as they worked their way towards the wood. The landscape feels open with clumps of forest and wood that breaks the sightlines. It was inside each of these clumps of forest and wood that the Germans were well dug in with machine guns set for interlocking fields of fire. The open wheat fields towards the German’s front were ranged for artillery and the Germans were in fortified and protected defensive positions. A herculean effort of unanticipated sacrifice would be necessary to dislodge the Germans.

            What transpired over the course of three weeks is bound up between fact and fiction; the facts, however, are undisputable. The U.S. Marines attacked on June 6th, 1918, suffered tremendous casualties and finally took all of Belleau Wood by 26 June. The U.S. Marine Corps that entered Belleau Wood, had little in common with the U.S. Marine Corps that exited those woods in late June. The historiography of the battle includes stinging criticism of the doctrine and tactics employed on 6 June. Large multi-row formations of Marines neatly spaced and moving forwards in unison commenced the attack. No smoke was used to obscure their advance. A 30-minute artillery barrage was employed to cover and support their attack, rather than a coordinated direct support effort intended to reduce the German defenses. The Marines formed in the blackness of night for a 03:45am attack. Several companies failed to link up on time. The attack went in the early morning with a rising sun. The attack advanced and the Marines clawed and scraped their way into the edge of the woods. They did so at a tremendous cost.

              From personal accounts and memoirs, the Battle of Belleau Wood was every bit as savage as portrayed. The Germans pushed hard and launched at least six separate attacks over the weeks of close fighting. Elton E. Mackin, a private who served in 1st Battalion, 5th Marines relays an interesting and significant aspect of the fighting. “We took Belleau Wood over a period of weeks, a bit at a time.”[28] Mackin goes on to further explain that the Marines ‘attacked the Germans at all hours of the day,’ opting to adopt an unpredictable method rather than the standard ‘dawn attacks’ of the British and French. Lastly, he comments that ““European troops, in this case, Germans and Austrians for the first time in history ran into aimed rifle fire which begins to kill at 800 yards.”[29]

            Mackin further commented  that “we were taught, we were trained to gauge with the scavenge on the bayonets.”  News reports across Europe and the United States reported “hand-to-hand fighting occurred during the night”[30] as the Marines captured over 250 Germans between the 6th and 9th of June. The fight would ebb and flow as the Marines would attack, settle in, defend a German counterattack, and then attack again. On the 12th. The Marines secured a breakthrough in the fighting that broke the back of the German defenses. The fighting in Belleau Wood was not the trench-warfare that dominated the preceding years. It was open warfare and “was very much a maneuver warfare battle” as “the Marines hit a gap and poured through it.”[31]

            The Marines learned quickly to implement ‘covered rushes’ whereby one element of 5-6 Marines would move 10-20 meters under the cover of another 5–6-man elements. They would bound this way into the woods constantly seeking cover. When covering, they would lay down a suppressive fire in order to keep German heads down. It was a slog as evidenced by the three constant weeks of shelling, machine gunning, and bayonet fighting.  More so, the evidence in Marine casualties; almost every Rifle Company commander was wounded or killed, numerous NCOs and old Corps veterans were also either killed or wounded. Junior Marines became veterans in those three weeks. Their steep learning curve, however, was overcome by their esprit; their dash and as the French so often pointed out, their élan.

            A critique of the Marine attack for Belleau Wood would highlight the failure to conduct thorough reconnaissance, the poor synchronization of supporting arms, poor coordination of mutual support, poor communications, failure to prepare reserves, the lack of contingency plans, and the failure to properly plan follow-on logistics support to the main element conducting the attack. Despite these glaring shortcomings, of which all contributed to the lengthy roster of casualties, the 4th Marine Brigade ‘had used up four German Divisions’ in the Battle of Belleau Wood.[32]

            The wheat field was a murder-trap that quickly consumed platoon after platoon. A platoon of 48 men was quickly reduced to 4 uninjured men as the German machine gunners focused on the open field.[33] Somehow, the Marines kept pressing forward. In small groups fighting independent actions, but sharing in the same objective; taking out every single German machine gun or hasty trench.

 

Figure 1: Map of Bois de Belleau. The Marine “limits of advance” are denoted in 

black, red, green, and blue ‘China marker.’[34]

VII: Conclusion

            Statistically speaking, the 4th Marine Brigade should have ceased to effectively function on 26 June 1918. The first three days of combat in Belleau Wood the Brigade suffered over 1,447 casualties and in the following six days saw another 1,714 casualties. [35] The effect of casualties on any fighting formation is debilitating but the numbers at Belleau Wood are significant. The combat quickly devolved into sharp small fights between squads and sections. Communications was terrible as senior commanders never quite had a common operating picture of the battlefield. The battle was ultimately left to the Company and Platoon Commanders along with their NCOs. Some battalions lost many of their officers in the first three days of action as the Marines ground their way deeper into the wood. The NCOs and younger Marines would lead the way as “1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, lost roughly 90 percent of its commissioned ranks as it fought across open ground to take Hill 142.”[36] Over 3,000 casualties in the first 20 days of June, 1918 demonstrates the vicious nature  of Belleau Wood. The Brigade entered Belleau Wood with 8,118 Marines on 6 June, 1918. On 30 June, the Brigade’s strength was 6,473 Marines.

            The 4th Marine Brigade was a scratch built ad hoc formation purposely organized for duty with the U.S. Army’s 2nd Infantry Division. As evidenced by the Marines’ duty as laborers and stevedores, neither regiment spent any training period  that tested the Brigade, Regiments, or Battalion Staffs. Individual Marines, while benefiting from the Quantico train-up period and the hours dedicated to trench clearing and bayonet drills at Carbon Blanc (2nd Division’s training camp) never quite received an all-arms cohesive training period that included Battalion sized live fire training. Ultimately, the Brigade went into Belleau Wood with what it had, seasoned and able leaders and young Marines with some grit. They certainly needed both once they met the enemy.

            The doctrine the Marines brought with them most certainly did not withstand the realities of the sort of modern industrialized warfare they experienced in Belleau Wood and the subsequent operations between July through November 1918. The U.S. Army’s Provisional Infantry Training Manual (1918) sought to address the shortcomings of  Navy-Marine manual; The Landing Force and Small Arms Instructions (1916). Massed prolonged artillery coupled with numerous automatic machine guns and chemicals changed the face of warfare. Nevertheless, as the doctrine changed owing to technology, a constant reinforced itself within the culture of the Marine Corps; decisive and aggressive leadership was first and foremost a tangible necessity which, across the 4th Marine Brigade, was in abundance in June 1918.

          The Marines at Belleau Wood, the old veterans like First Sergeant Daly or CPT Williams and Colonel Catlin from the Philippines, China, Haiti, and Cuba, led the youngsters from Parris Island and Mare Island. The Germans took a toll on the Brigade and the Corps lost a number of its old hands. But the ethos, the esprit, and the unique culture of the Corps helped transform the young Marines into leaders who continued the fight.  Many new Marines filled the vacant leadership positions and they had the example of the old veterans to help them through. The pre-war focus on rifle marksmanship and bayonet close combat was effectively applied against German counter-attacks. Old doctrine, full of rows, skirmish lines, and assault lines gave way to covered rushes of smaller numbers. The veteran Marine Company and Battalion Commanders adjusted to the conditions they faced but, in the end, it was four or five Marines like Privates T.S. Allen and Elton Mackin, led by an aggressive NCO such as Sergeant Kucak, that took out the German machine guns one at a time.

            It is fitting that over each grave of each U.S. Marine buried during that savage  month of June 1918, a wreath of palms was laid inscribed with the words: “Hommage de Paris aux Défenseurs de la patrie” (Paris Honors the Defenders of the nation.) Brigadier General Catlin, in his post-war memoirs stated that of the U.S. Marines and the Battle of Belleau Wood, “they left in that wood some of the best blood of America”[37] and an enduring legacy.

 

Figure 2: Photograph. The wheat fields with Belleau Wood just in front.[38]

        -PRE-

CITATIONS

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[1]  For details on the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) see the U.S. Center for Military History, United States Army  In The World War  1917-1919, General Orders, GHQ, AEF, Volume 16, 1988, for background: https://history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/resmat/wwi/prologue/default/index.html .

[2] Ralph Stoney Bates, Sr, Maj., USMC,  “Belleau Wood: A Brigade's Human Dynamics,” Marine Corps Gazette; Nov 2015; 12.

[3] U.S. M.C. Recruiting Card, The World War One National Museum and Memorial, Card, Recruiting U.S. Marine Corps. One side lists words to the Star Spangled Banner, other side gives facts on the U.S. Marine Corps. Distributed by U.S.M.C. Recruiting Station, Peoria, Illinois.

[4] Craig Hamilton and Louse Corbin, Ed., Echoes From Over There: By the Men of the Army and the Marines Who Fought in France,  (New York: The Soldier’s Publishing Company, 1919), 11.

[5] Edwin North McClellan, The United States Marine Corps in the World War, Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1920.

[6] Elmore A. Champie, A Brief History Of The Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island, South Carolina 1891-1962, Marine Corps Historical Reference Series, No. 8, (Washington D.C.: Historical Branch G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1962) 4.

[7] Elton Mackin, Interviewed by Carl D. Klopfenstein, Professor of History at Heidelberg College, Ohio, June 29, 1973, Rutherford B. Hayes Presidential Library & Museums, Library of Congress Veterans History Project, Published by Presidio Press, 1993.

[8] For details related to U.S. Marine close order drill and employment of small units in action , see Simmons, Through the Wheat, 16-17,34; and Millett, Semper Fidelis, 298; further discussion includes Edwin N. McClellan, “Operations of the Fourth Brigade of Marines in the Aisne Defensive,” Marine Corps Gazette, June 1920, and Edwin N. McClellan, “The Fourth Brigade of Marines in the Training Areas and the Operations in the Verdun Sector,” Marine Corps Gazette, March 1920.

[9] Peter T. Underwood, Col. USMC (Ret), “General Pershing and the U.S. Marines,” Marine Corps History, Volume 5, Number 2, Winter 2019, pp. 5-20.

[10] Bernard Nalty, The United States Marines In The War With Spain, U.S. Marine Corps Historical Pamphlet, (Washington D.C.: Historical Branch G-3 Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1959, Revised 1967), 16.

[11] Stephen M. Fuller, CPT, USMCR and Graham Cosmas, Marines in the Dominican Republic, 1916-1924, (Washington D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1975).

[12] For World War 1 pre-war training see The National Archives and Records Administration: World War 1 Centennial, “Training the Soldier,” https://www.archives.gov/topics/wwi/training.

[13] “The Official History of the 2nd Infantry Division during World War 1, 1918,” (The Combined Arms Research Library, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1918), 25.

[14] Ibid, 8.

[15] Anderson, Col. William T. USMCR(Ret), The Bravest Deeds of Men: A Field Guide for the Battle of Belleau Wood, (Quantico, Virginia: History Division, United States Marine Corps, 2018), 2-5.

[16] Bettez, David J., Heroic Deeds, Heroic Men : the U.S. Marine Corps and the Final Phase of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, 1-11 November 1918. Quantico, VA: History Division, MCU Press, 2020.

[17] Department of the Navy, The Landing Force and Small Arms Instructions: United States Navy, 1916, Revised 1916, Containing Firing Regulations, 1917, (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1917), 5.

[18] The Command and General Staff College: Provisional Infantry Training Manual 1918, Training Circular No. 8, War Department, Document No. 844, Office of the Adjutant General, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1918), 10.

[19] The National Archives, Washington D.C., “Second Division Training In Third (Bourmont) Training Area And With French Second Army, July 1917-March 17, 1918,” documents and (3) Film Reels, Reel 1, Silent.

[20] James McBrayer Sellers, Lt Col, USMC, World War I Memoirs, William W. Sellers and George B. Clark, ed, (Pike, N.H.: The Brass Hat, 1997), 52.

[21] The National Archives, Washington D.C., “Second Division Training In Third (Bourmont) Training Area And With French Second Army, July 1917-March 17, 1918,” documents and (3) Film Reels, Reel 2, Silent.

[22] Herbert H. Akers, History of the Third Battalion Sixth Regiment, U.S. Marines, (Hillsdale, MI: Akers, Mac Ritchie, Hurlbut, 1919), 8.

[23] George B.Clark, Devil Dogs : Fighting Marines of World War I, (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1999).

[24] J. Michael Miller, The 4th Marine Brigade at Belleau Wood and Soissons: History and Battlefield Guide, (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2020), 221.

[25] Ibid, 121.

[26] Albertus W. Catlin, With The Help of God and A Few Marines: The Battles of Chateau Thierry and Belleau Wood, (New York: Doubleday and Sons, 1919, reprint 2016) 82.

[27] United States Navy: Naval History and Heritage Command, “Brigadier General, USMC, (1868-1933),” https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/photography/us-people/c/catlin-albertus-w.html.

[28] Elton E. Mackin, Suddenly We Didn’t Want to Die: Memoirs of a WW1 Marine, (Novato, CA: Presidion Press, 1993), 50.

[29] Ibid, 4.

[30]"Steam Roller Busy Against The Huns: Belleau Wood A Happy Hunting Ground For The Americans Take 250 More Prisoners German Commanders Told Their Troops That Army Had Landed In America--U. S. Artillery Brilliantly Carries Out Its Part." The Sun (1837-), Jun 27, 1918. 2, https://go.openathens.net/redirector/liberty.edu?url=https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/steam-roller-busy-against-huns/docview/534768160/se-2.

[31] Bradley J. Meyer, “The Battle of Belleau Wood,” Marine Corps Gazette; Quantico Vol. 102, Iss. 6,  (Jun 2018): 26-29.

[32] S.L.A. Marshall, World War I, (New York: Mariner Books, Houghton-Mifflin Company, 2001), 384.

[33]   J. Michael Miller, The 4th Marine Brigade at Belleau Wood and Soissons: History and Battlefield Guide, (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2020), 143.

[34] The Library of Congress,  “Map of Belleau Wood,” James G. Harbord Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (134.00.00). This map, from the papers of General James G. Harbord, commander of the Marines at Belleau Wood, depicts the course of the battle. https://www.loc.gov/exhibitions/world-war-i-american-experiences/about-this-exhibition/over-there/belleau-wood/bois-de-belleau/.

[35] 2nd Division Summary of Operations in the World War, Prepared by the American Battle Monuments Commission, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1944), 23.

[36] Richard S. Faulkner, "Doughboy Devil Dogs: U.S. Army Officers In The 4th Brigade In The Great War." Marine Corps History 7, no. 1 (2021): 5-23. muse.jhu.edu/article/805928.

[37] A.W. Catlin, Brigadier General, USMC, and Walter A. Dyer, With the Help of God and a Few Marines, (New York: Doubleday, Page, and Co., 1919), 7.

[38]Ray P. Antrim, Where the Marines Fought in France, (Chicago, Ill: Park and Antrim, 1919), 29.