Clausewitz and Jomini: Drawing the Line between Art and Science

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Clausewitz and Jomini: Drawing the Line between 

Art and Science


In the West, two military philosophers have had much influence on the military arts and, will remain influential for time to come. But both are influential for different reasons. And many immediately see their similarities but their differences, however, are very nuanced.

Jomini has had many readers, and simultaneously, critics as well. Especially when compared against Clausewitz. And “most of what Jomini had to contribute that was of real value—which was a great deal—has long since been absorbed into the way we write practical doctrine.”[1]

Jomini thought warfare as the ultimate drama to be conducted between geniuses. And Jomini surely saw (or preferred) combat between ‘chivalrous’ hosts. “As a soldier, preferring loyal and chivalrous warfare to organized assassination.”[2]

Both men were ‘of their time’ however, Clausewitz, being heavily influenced by such ‘Continentalist’ philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, (and often via the ‘dialectic’, Hegel) approached war from a historical method reaching back to the past, incorporating the present, and attempting to anticipate the future.

Clausewitz “was dialectic in its approach and Clausewitz’s central theme was that war and the art of decision-making defied rote categorization and solutions.”[3]

 Thus science; Clausewitz believed that warfare, although possessing scientific aspects and elements, was far from a science. Adding to the confusion, Jomini has been quoted as saying warfare is but an inexact science. But, in the end, Jomini does provide warfare as a science by way of reducing it to the study of its fundamental elements, it’s ‘principles’ or simple map studies.

Jomini “took an opposite approach and categorized warfare not as art but science with an adherence to basic principles such as lines of operation and an emphasis on practical knowledge although he attempted to refute this statement in the conclusion of his essay.”[4]

 Jomini, however, was indeed influential and continues to be so for differing reasons. “Where Jomini’s work was prescriptive, Clausewitz was very descriptive in his conception of war in which he elevates it to an art only loosely conforming to principles.”[5] As for Jomini, he continues to influence the tactical and perhaps operational level of warfare. His principles are widely understood and remain so also, across military institutions. He begins his book, The Art of War by recommending attacking to defending; “it is better to attack than to be invaded”[6] whereas Clausewitz begins his work On War much like Kant or Hegel with the definitions of terms. Chapter 1 is “What is War?” and he goes to state that “war therefore, is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.”[1]

Clausewitz sought to expand the understanding of the very nature or essence of warfare. And the method selected resulted in his famous ‘trinity’: the government, the people, and its military. Military theorists and philosopher today continue the debate as to the complexity and subtlety of Clausewitz’ theories from On War and Clausewitz is continued to be studied across military institutions the world over.

 

 

*A note on pronunciation: The W is simply pronounced as a V thus…ClauseVitz rather than Claus-A-Witz!

 

 

[1] Clausewitz, Carl von, On War, Princeton University Press, Princeton: 2008 p.13


[1] Bassford, Christopher, “JOMINI AND CLAUSEWITZ: Their Interaction”, 23rd Meeting of the
Consortium on Revolutionary Europe at Georgia State University 26 February 1993, https://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Jomini/JOMINIX.htm accessed on 20 November 2018

[2] Jomini, Antoine-Henri, Mendell, and G.H., Craighill, W.P., The Art of War, Courier Corporation, North Chelmsford: 2007 p.31

[3] Otero, Christopher, “Reflections on Clausewitz and Jomini: A Discussion on Theory, MDMP, and Design in the Post OIF Army”, Small Wars Journal, 2011, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/772-otero.pdf, accessed on 20 November 2018

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Jomini, Antoine-Henri, Mendell, and G.H., Craighill, W.P., Courier Corporation, North Chelmsford: 2007 p.21


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