"Conventional Commanders in an Unconventional War: The U.S. Army in Vietnam 1965-1972"

 This is the introduction to "Conventional Commanders"...

Introduction

“More combat battalions from the U. S. are necessary. A total of 13 additional battalions need to be sent now. On June 15, we announced 75,000 men or 15 battalions. A total of 28 battalions is now necessary.”

 

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara

National Security Council Meeting, July 27, 1965[1]

 

On a cold February afternoon in 1966, Marlys Lippman held a weathered package in her hands. Marked with the word “DECEASED,” she had mailed to her brother two months prior. Her brother, Lieutenant Colonel Gordan Lippman, a native of South Dakota, was killed in South Vietnam on 11 December 1965. He was serving as the Executive Officer (XO) of the 1^st Brigade, 1^st Infantry Division, one of the first two infantry divisions sent to South Vietnam in mid-1965.  LTC Lippman was killed by an enemy sniper one evening on the firebase.[2]

Forty-one years old, LTC Lippman was deployed to his third war in his twenty-two-year career. He was survived by his wife and three young children. LTC Lippman first saw combat during the Second World War in Italy with the 517^th Parachute Infantry Regiment. He later jumped into Southern France during Operation Dragoon. In Belgium, then SGT Lippman, led a machine gun platoon in the absence of the platoon leader in December 1944. Although wounded, SGT Lippman continued providing leadership to the platoon during a deliberate battalion attack in Hotton, Belgium. SGT Lippman received a battlefield commission associated with leadership and his courageous actions during the Battle of the Bulge in Belgium.

        After WWII  LTC Lippman remained in the Army  and  completed his education. Like all of his peers in South Vietnam, LTC Lipman spent time as a platoon leader, adjutant, Battalion Intelligence Officer (S-2) and a Company Executive Officer (XO). After the Korean Conflict, LTC Lippman attended the U.S. Army War College at Carlise Barracks in Carlise, Pennsylvania. By the time he deployed to South Vietnam as the XO of the 3^rd Brigade, 1^st Infantry Division, he was an Army veteran with twenty-two years of service and combat experience in Italy, France, Belgium, and Korea.

The U.S. Army maneuver commanders dispatched to South Vietnam were the most experienced, seasoned, and educated combat leaders ever to take to the field. Of twenty-nine maneuver battalion commanders who served in South Vietnam in 1965 eighteen experienced combat during the Second World War. Like LTC Lippman, all twenty-nine also saw action in Korea. Sixteen of these commanders were commissioned during the Second World War with two receiving ‘battlefield commissions.’ Lieutenant Colonels Gordon Lippman and James Nix received the Distinguished Service Cross for actions in Korea while Lieutenant Colonel Lloyd Burke was a recipient of the Medal of Honor for his actions in that conflict. [3]

Thirteen of the twenty-nine commanders identified, were commissioned through the U.S. Army’s Officer Candidate School. Additionally, four were commissioned via the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) while nine were commissioned from the United States Military Academy (USMA) West Point. Lastly, of these twenty-nine maneuver commanders, four became Generals, two retired as Colonels and the preponderance of them served multiple tours in South Vietnam. The maneuver commanders who served in the Republic of South Vietnam stand unmatched in the annals of U.S. Army history—a cadre of leaders forged in the crucible of combat. Unlike their counterparts in the Second World War, many of whom entered the fight without prior battlefield experience, these commanders embodied a level of seasoned expertise unparalleled before or since. Their journey, shaped by relentless conflict, exemplifies the height of military leadership under fire.

In what ways did the battlefield dominance of U.S. Army maneuver commanders in South Vietnam shape the broader strategies and outcomes of America’s military efforts? By examining the extent to which maneuver commanders, veterans of WWII and the Korean War, executed the strategy via operations and tactics employed in the Vietnam War, we can not only assess their effectiveness but assess how these combat leaders, from maneuver battalions through Division, Corps and beyond, influenced the trajectory of the conflict. In contrast to the predominant top-down analysis characterizing much of the military history of the Vietnam War, which focuses on the U.S. Army as an organization and institution, this research delves into the specific impact of these experienced commanders on military decision-making and execution during the Vietnam War. While MACV managed the war, the mid-level commanders executed combat operations within the framework of an overall strategy.

This research is the first to examine the U.S. Army maneuver commanders of the Vietnam War as a cohesive group. While the historiography infrequently touches on these commanders and their participation during the Vietnam War, most of the works within the historiography focus on the strategy or the political and diplomatic history. Researching the maneuver commanders provides unique insights, reveals often neglected decisions and actions, and, most importantly, highlights how the executors of strategy understood their tasks, formulated actions, and influenced the trajectory of the U.S. Army's involvement in the war in South Vietnam.

The relationships between the maneuver commanders from battalion through division level in Vietnam between 1965 and 1973 and their higher headquarters are examined here to determine the ‘so what’ of the conflict and the challenges experienced by the U.S. Army.[4] This work, then, illuminates the challenges of the maneuver commanders, their interactions with subordinate commanders, and their understanding of their tasks while leading their formations in combat. The history of the American involvement in South Vietnam, and especially of the U.S. Army's role in this conflict, is almost exclusively focused on why the United States involved itself in the war or why the strategy failed to deliver victory. The maneuver battalion and brigade commanders do not have a voice in the history of the Vietnam War. This study addresses this oversight and illuminates this critical aspect of history by demonstrating that the subordinate commanders influenced the war's prosecution and helped shape a strategy that evolved, re-oriented operations, and developed innovative tactics.

The maneuver commanders are assessed as an entity that fully participated in the war in such a way as to affect outcomes. Specific research inquires how Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) communicated its requirements to the battalion-level command and what shaped the battalion commander's actions toward these MACV requirements. This research examines some of the metrics that drove operations and how the maneuver commanders' personal experiences in WWII and Korea influenced their decisions, operations, and understanding of the tasks they faced in Vietnam. Lastly, the research analyzed primary records to determine how often the commanders focused on kinetic and non-kinetic operations like village medical programs, agricultural assistance, and infrastructure development.[5]

Contemporary historians question the conventional idea that General Westmoreland exclusively focused on attrition and search and destroy.[6]  Some argue that commanders in Vietnam recognized the need to address both pacification and security requirements and made efforts to do so. Dr. Gregory Daddis, a retired U.S. Army Colonel and former head of the Department of History at the United States Military Academy at West Point, contends in three of his contemporary works that MACV was “awash in statistics” and that the U.S. Army in Vietnam was “insufficiently versed in the mysteries of counterinsurgency.” As a result, the Army increasingly relied on statistical measures to gauge and report progress and effectiveness. This raises critical questions: How effective was MACV in communicating and emphasizing the necessity of balancing kinetic and non-kinetic requirements to subordinate commanders? Furthermore, how did maneuver unit commanders interpret and implement this guidance?

How the battalion, brigade, and division-level maneuver commanders interpreted the strategy and crafted tasks, operations, and missions for their subordinate formations are examined in detail. The research assesses the approaches commanders use to tackle search and destroy operations, security, and pacification in their areas of operations. When the United States committed ground forces to Vietnam, the 1965 period included a buildup in troops, infrastructure, and materials.[7] General Westmoreland understood his task of engaging Communist forces across South Vietnam while simultaneously expanding the logistics infrastructure, reinforcing the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), and securing the populace by pacification and other counterinsurgency techniques, including medical visits and clinics at the village level, infrastructure development such as repairing irrigation, and general education courses. Major counterinsurgency tasks envisioned by MACV included ‘unifying the civil and military efforts necessary’ to separate the populace from the Viet Cong. Additional efforts included forming local civil defense (Regional Force/Provincial Force), civil affairs programs to enhance the trust of the RVN government, and investment in infrastructure programs that opened opportunities for education and commerce.[8]

Some of the historiography has forcefully argued that the strategy developed and implemented in Vietnam was often vague, evolving, and ultimately, flawed. However, recent studies have further advanced our understanding of the issues associated with the strategy through metrics and an overwhelming volume of data that MACV collected daily during the war.[9] While debates on strategy and the lack of any meaningful measurement for success exist, a cohesive study of the executors of MACV's strategy is necessary to understand the relationship between the commander, Generals Westmoreland and later Abrams, MACV, and the subordinate maneuver commanders in the field. This relationship is significant in understanding the connection between strategy and tactical operations. This relationship between MACV and the subordinate maneuver commanders serves as the primary framework for this study.

This study concentrates on the actual actors, the commanders at the tactical and operational level, who implemented MACVs strategy and campaign plans at the lowest level across the forty-four provinces and four hundred and fifty districts in the Republic of Vietnam. The unit-level field commanders made the decisions across these provinces and districts with profound consequences. This study significantly adds to the body of work comprising the Vietnam War's historiography. Specifically, this study expands on the work of previous scholars concerning the MACV strategy developed and implemented in early 1965 by General Westmoreland and his staff. It broadens the understanding of how subordinate commanders interpret their orders, directives, and the tasks imposed on them via the field force, corps, division, and brigade headquarters.

Additionally, maneuver commanders here are linked to the strategy, doctrine, and the myriad of critical tasks they executed during the initial period of the Vietnam War. Unlike any previous U.S. Army operations, commanders faced a multifaceted campaign encompassing counterinsurgency, pacification, security, intelligence collection, search and destroy operations, and training or collaborating with the Army of South Vietnam forces (ARVN).

This research delves into three pivotal areas, shedding light on the commanders who shaped the battlefield in South Vietnam from 1965 to 1973. At its heart is an in-depth examination of the leaders at the helm of maneuver formations—from battalion to corps level. What sets these commanders apart? Their journeys through professional education institutions and their wealth of experience shaped their approach to tactical operations. These Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels didn't arrive in Vietnam as novices—they were seasoned warriors, combat-tested in World War II or Korea, and were well aware of basic counterinsurgency principles. Armed with this rare combination of knowledge and battlefield acumen, they stood at the intersection of tradition and innovation, confronting a war unlike any they had fought before.

The Vietnam War historiography contains much debate and contention regarding the ‘search and destroy’ operations mandated by MACV. As U.S. combat power increased, MACV urged the infantry divisions to carry out extensive sweeps and combined operations across significant areas of South Vietnam. At the same time, pacification programs expanded, and maneuver commanders led simultaneous operations ranging from security patrols to intelligence collection to searching, destroying, and supporting the ARVN. Maneuver commanders invariably influenced the trajectory of operations throughout each phase of the war and, in doing so, influenced strategy.

Lastly, the final area examined includes an assessment of the commanders and their influence on MACV between 1965 and 1973. Once the first wave of commanders arrived, research demonstrates that over time, they influenced MACV through after-action reports, intelligence summaries, and statistics reported from 'body counts' to areas pacified, villages secured, and operations conducted. Analysis reveals how the commanders influenced MACV and, thus, the strategy. Tactically, the rifle companies and platoons hoped to draw out main force Viet Cong formations into open battle to apply close air support and field artillery to destroy them.[10] They performed patrols, sweeps, search and destroy, cordon, and intelligence collection.

 

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[1]“[NSC Meeting on] Deployment of Additional U. S. Troops in Vietnam, 7/27/1965, Volume 3, Tab 35,” National Security Council Meetings Files, NSF, Box 1, LBJ Presidential Library.

 [2] John Andrews, “Lippman was Lemmon's Hero,” South Dakota Magazine.com, November 16, 2011. https://www.southdakotamagazine.com/lippman-was-lemmons-hero.

[3] “Distinguished Service Cross Recipients, Korean War, 1950-1953,”

July 1, 2021, U.S. Department of Defense, Military Awards for Valor - Top 3,

https://valor.defense.gov/Portals/24/Documents/ServiceCross/Army%20DSC_Korean%20War_2021%2007%2001.pdf.

[4] Maneuver Commanders were from the infantry, and armor. While the artillery and engineer battalion and brigade commanders are beyond the scope of this study, their importance to the maneuver commanders' success and failure cannot be stressed enough. Between 1950 and 1964, prior to the deployment of combat battalions and brigades in 1965, the MAAG-Vietnam staff and personnel served across RVN as advisors (on teams). No combat battalions were present in the pre-1965 period of any significance or importance to this study.

[5] Two personalities profoundly influenced counterinsurgency and anti-guerilla operations, as initially implemented in the Republic of Vietnam. David Galula, author of Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, published in 1964, presented his unique observations of guerilla operations and activities and, most importantly, commendations on countering guerilla and insurgent operations. Galula had previously published his observations of the French counterinsurgency efforts in Algeria on behalf of the RAND Corporation. (See Pacification in Algeria, published by the RAND Corporation in 1963). Galula stresses the importance of ‘the population, the civil populace,' as the 'center of gravity' for both the insurgency and the counterinsurgency. Non-kinetic operations would include protecting villages, establishing local governance, providing valuable services, educating and dominating the information campaign, providing medical support, reinforcing host-nation security and military operations, and improving infrastructure. While Galula had extensive experience across China, Greece, and Algeria (as a successful Company Commander), Robert Thompson, a British RAF officer serving in Malaya and Burma during the Second World War, served in Malaya on staff as an advisor during the Malaya Emergency. See Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences in Malaya and Vietnam (Study in International Security), Chatto & Windus, 1966. Thompson served as a “British Advisory Mission to South Vietnam” member in Vietnam. While popular with the South Vietnamese, he fell out of favor with many in the American military establishment in Saigon. Much like Galula, Thompson proposed that for the counter-insurgent, the 'populace' or the people are the fundamental base to be secured.' The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSE) 'Program of Instruction (Syllabus) for the period between 1963 and 1964 showed a total of 40 hours dedicated to topics such as Counterinsurgencies, Strategic Appraisals (South East Asia), Military Assistance Command, and Introduction to Unconventional Warfare. For more on the GCSE syllabus, see U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, June 1962, Program of Instruction for 250-A-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, September 17, 1962.

[6] On General Westmoreland, MACV, and the U.S. Army's strategy in Vietnam, see Gregory Daddis’ Westmoreland’s War: Reassessing American Strategy in Vietnam. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). This work argues against Lewis Sorley’s Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam (New York: Houghton, Mifflin, Harcourt, 2011).

 [7] See Richard W. Stewart, Deepening Involvement 1945-1965, The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Vietnam War. (Washington D.C.: The Center for Military History, United States Army, 2012) and Frank L. Jones, The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Vietnam War. (Washington D.C.: The Center for Military History, United States Army, 2015).

[8] Texas Technical University, The Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Department of the Army Field Manual FM 31-15, “Operations Against Irregular Forces,” May 1961.

 [9] For a deeper understanding of the metrics, see Col. Gregory Daddis’ excellent study: No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). Daddis argues that the U.S. Army, “insufficiently versed in the mysteries of counterinsurgency,” turned to statistics, leading to an overwhelming volume of monthly data that prevented understanding the war. 234.

[10] For Rifle Platoons and Squads, see FM 7-15 (U.S. Army Field Manual) Rifle Platoon and Squads

Infantry, Airborne, and Mechanized, (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1965) as well as FM 7-11 Rifle Company, Infantry, Airborne Infantry, and Mechanized Infantry (1962), FM 7-20 Infantry, Airborne Infantry and Mechanized Infantry Battalion s (1962). “The Army Lineage Series,” by John K. Mahon and Romana Danysh, Infantry Part 1: Regular Army, (Washington D.C.: Office of The Chief of Military History,

United States Army, 1972). Of interest is the section on “ROAD and Flexible Response,” which details the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) changes to the standard configuration of infantry battalions, brigades, and Divisions post-Second World War and just before 1965 and the Vietnam War. By 1965, typical infantry battalions were configured against the Light Infantry TOE with one headquarters and headquarters company, four rifle companies, a combat support company, and a total strength of 920 Soldiers.