A Historiography of the WWII Surrender of Japan: Unconditional Surrender, the Atomic Bomb, and "Operation Downfall"

 

A Historiography of the WWII Surrender of Japan: 

Unconditional Surrender, the Atomic Bomb, 

and "Operation Downfall"

On the 15^th of August 1945, at noon, Emperor Hirohito announced, via a phonograph recording, that Japan had accepted the ‘provisions’ of the joint declaration of the United States, Great Britain, and China. The Japanese had finally surrendered after a long and very bloody conflict across the Pacific and Asia. In the days preceding the emperor’s announcement, the United States Army Air Force detonated two atomic weapons over Japanese cities. On 6 August 1945 on the city of Hiroshima and again on 9 August 1945 on the city of Nagasaki. A conservative estimate of over 200,000 or more perished from these two atomic weapons.   The reasons for Japan’s surrender in 1945 are a source of continued debate and several camps of historians and writers have established themselves: the orthodox or traditionalists, the revisionists, and a third camp of ‘consensus’ historians.

The orthodox or ‘traditionalist’ historians supported the use of atomic weapons and claim their use as the specific reason that Japan surrendered. The ‘revisionists’, however, are in opposition to the use of atomic weapons and have provided an alternate argument as to Japan’s capitulation; they argue that Japan was close to surrendering and the added threat of the Soviet Union invading the North were the reasons for capitulation.  Lastly, the ‘consensus historians’ who occupy a middle ground somewhere between the ‘traditionalists’ and the ‘revisionists.’ The ‘consensus’ camps arguments are broad and may support elements or aspects of the larger two camps, but simultaneously take issue with the main themes of both.

The associated historiographical trends have evolved over time, but the debate started almost immediately after the first weapon was used. From 15 September 1945 there was tacit support of the use of atomic weapons and their effect; forcing the surrender of Japan. As time and politics changed course post war there were others who began to write that the Japanese, having been conventionally destroyed by June 1945 by air and sea power, were on the verge of capitulating without use of the atomic weapons. By the 1960’s new arguments appeared that were fundamentally against the use of atomic weapons and posited a belief that the threat of ‘Soviet invasion from the North’ had a much greater influence on the Japanese surrender.

 

The background leading up to the August 6^th use of the first atomic weapon frames the divisions between all three camps. The War in Europe had come to a close in May of 1945. The pressure was now on in Washington D.C. to quickly end the War in the Pacific. But by 1945 the Imperial Japanese Forces continued to resist, and they did so with a tenacity and viciousness that many saw as a foreshadowing of the cost to an invasion against the home islands. The Battles of Saipan, Iwo Jima and Okinawa were fought and won at tremendous cost. The casualties across the Pacific for the previous twelve months were “over 200,000 casualties from wounds, fatigue and disease, plus 10,000 American dead and missing in the Marianas, 5,500 dead on and around Leyte, 9,000 dead during the Luzon campaign, 6,800 at Iwo Jima, 12,600 at Okinawa, and 2,000 killed in the unexpectedly vicious fighting on Peleliu.”[1]

With the recent numbers in casualties in mind, the planning for the eventual invasion of the Japanese home islands began to take shape in the late spring of 1945. Running on a parallel track with the planning of ‘Operation Downfall, was the deployment of a specialized Bomb Group, the ‘509^th Composite Group’ flying the new B-29. This group had been formed to specifically prepare for operational use of atomic weapons against Japan. None of the planners for Operation Downfall knew of the new secret weapon to include General Douglas McArthur, Commander of U.S. Army Forces in the Far East.

 

The traditionalist or orthodox view of Japan’s surrender is that the atomic weapons used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki drove the emperor to agree to the terms for surrender as outlined by the former President, President Roosevelt at the Potsdam conference in mid-July 1945. Further, the orthodox view is that the atomic weapons saved hundreds of thousands of lives of both, American and Japanese and shortened the war. The planned invasion of the Japanese home islands, if executed, was to be enormous in scale and would have incorporated many U.S. servicemen fresh from the fighting in Europe. The logistics requirements were beyond the capacity of all Allied forces in the Pacific. And key to the planning factors were enormous casualty predictions. Predictions that had been fully reported to the Joint Service Chiefs and the President, President Truman.

An argument after the war for use of the atomic bomb was penned by the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson in his 1947 ‘Harper’s Magazine’ article on the decisions made and the reasoning for the new weapons use in Japan.  Stimpson summarizes:

Two great nations were approaching contact in a fight to a finish which would begin on November 1, 1945.Our enemy, Japan, commanded forces of somewhat over 5,000,000 armed men.  Men of these armies had already inflicted upon us, in our breakthrough of the outer perimeter of their defenses, over 300,000 battle casualties.[2]

 

Post-World War II writers and historians from the 1940s and 1950s tacitly supported the use of the atomic weapons and believed their use shortened the war. The prevailing belief by a majority continued reiterating this theme into the early ‘atomic age’ of the 1950’s.  Karl T. Compton wrote in December 1946 issue of “The Atlantic” magazine:

Was Japan already beaten before the atomic bomb? The answer is certainly "yes" in the sense that the fortunes of war had turned against her. The answer is "no" in the sense that she was still fighting desperately and there was every reason to believe that she would continue to do so; and this is the only answer that has any practical significance.[3]

 

In essence, the historians and writers of the early post war period saw the decisions made by Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, as well as Secretary of War Stimspon and many Generals and Admirals from the Pacific theater as a most ‘obvious course of action’ in terminating the Pacific War. The ‘bomb’ saved countless lives, forced Japan to surrender, and thus shortened the war.  It was during the Cold War in the mid-1960’s that historians began to question the issues and facts, as they were then known, about the decision to use atomic weapons in 1945 and the causes for Japan’s surrender.

         The 1960’s saw both Japanese and Western historians question the use of the atomic weapons and argue against the initial government casualty estimates for an invasion against the home islands of Japan.  Chief among the revisionists is Gar Alperovitz, a historian who wrote “Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam” published in 1965. Alperovitz argues that the atomic bomb was never needed to force the Japanese to surrender. He argued “that the then evidence available pointed to three major conclusions: first, that the first use of these terrible weapons was unnecessary; second, that this was understood by decision makers at the time; and third that there was very substantial though not absolutely definitive evidence that by the late summer of 1945 the decision was primarily influenced by diplomatic considerations related to the Soviet Union.”[4]

Alperovitz and others argued that the atomic weapon was not necessary and provided data from ‘The Strategic Bombing Survey’, a U.S. led report of the Allied bombing offensives against Germany and Japan, which concluded that Japan was close to surrendering from the effects of conventional bombing. Most importantly, Alperovitz argues, from the revisionist standpoint, Truman was embarking on a sort of ‘diplomacy with atomic weapons’ in order to influence the Soviets and the post-World War II political landscape. “According to Alperovitz there was a "quite general" notion amongst U.S. officials at Potsdam that the bomb would strengthen U.S. diplomacy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.”[5] Thus was born the idea of ‘atomic diplomacy.’

The revisionists also saw many within the U.S. Armed Forces who had stated that the use of atomic weapons was ‘impractical, unnecessary or immoral’. Alperovitz cites many Admirals and Generals who were not in agreement with the administrations use of the atomic weapons. “Adm. William Leahy, President Truman’s Chief of Staff, wrote in his 1950 memoir “I Was There” that “the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan.[6]

Martin Sherwin, author of “A World Destroyed” joins with Alperovitz in the revisionist camp stating that ‘three alternatives’ existed which would have avoided the use of atomic weapons altogether. One, a simple removal of the word ‘unconditional’ from the surrender mandate imposed by Roosevelt. Truman could have reviewed the terms and provided for the safety, security, and continuity of the Japanese Emperor. Secondly, delay the use of the atomic weapons until after the 8^th of August 1945, in order to allow the Soviets to enter the war (as promised at Potsdam), and thirdly, a continued blockade and bombardment as proposed by President Truman’s Chief of Staff. “Admiral William J. Leahy wrote to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 14^th, 1945, was to defeat Japan by isolation, blockade, and bombardment by sea and air forces”.[7]

 

The consensus historians straddle both the orthodox and revisionist camps at times. Some arguments are along finer seams in the debate. The bomb was not necessary nor could any sitting President at the time ignore their eventual use. Some argue that the atomic weapons were needed but not the deciding factor in Japan’s surrender. Among the consensus historians Dennis Wainstock argues “that had the United States given Japan conditional surrender terms, including retention of the emperor, Japan would have surrendered significantly earlier than it did.”[8] President Roosevelt’s mandate that the Japanese be forced to an ‘unconditional surrender’ has left many historians, such as Wainstock, to link the terms of an unconditional surrender to Japan’s continued unconditional ‘resistance’.

Of the many ‘consensus’ historians J. Samuel Walker straddles the middle ground in such a way so as to avoid passing moral judgement. Walker presents two questions in the debate over Hiroshima and the atomic bomb. Was dropping ‘the bomb’ even necessary?  And what did it accomplish? In “Prompt and Utter Destruction” Walker arrives at the answer to his two questions of necessity and accomplishment straddling that middle ground: “In view of the evidence now available, the answer is yes and no.”[9] Yes, the bombs were necessary, and they helped to save American lives. And no, the bomb was not necessary to end the war in a short period without an invasion of the Japanese home islands. He also adds that the bombs saved lives surely, but not on the order of hundreds of thousands of lives. In this way, Walker avoids any passing of judgement.

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa writes in “Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan” that in Japan, the focus and belief of many is that the Soviets were the driving force in Japan’s surrender. “Soviet entry into the war shocked the Japanese even more than the atomic bombs because it meant the end of any settlement short of unconditional surrender.”[10] Hasegawa fits in with the consensus camp as an alternative giving tremendous weight to the Soviet Union’s role in shocking the Japanese into surrendering.

Lastly, Noriko Kawamura provides yet another possibility from within Japan and the Emperor himself. Writing in “Emperor Hirohito and the Pacific War” Kawamura states that      "by early May, [1945] the emperor was prepared, however reluctantly and vaguely, to consider accepting the terms that he had previously opposed, including disarmament and punishment of Japan's war leaders by the allies, as long as Japan could preserve its sovereignty.”[11]

Over time and especially in the late twentieth and early twenty first century historians are continuing the debate with vigor. Robert James Maddox openly critiques Alperovitz and “challenged what he saw as "blatant revisionist distortions" in order to construct his argument that the single-most decisive factor in forcing the Japanese to surrender and preventing a costly land invasion of Japan was the use of the atomic bombs.”[12]

Alperovitz, however, has all but maintained the drumbeat that the weapons were unnecessary and galvanized the revisionist ‘passing of judgement’ in their arguments against the need of the bomb and employed the ‘ulterior motive’ reasoning for use of the atomic weapons: making the post War Soviet Union ‘more manageable’ and implementing ‘atomic diplomacy’.

 

 ‘Operation Downfall’ was essentially a two-part invasion of the Japanese home islands and would have been the last effort in the great and exhausting Pacific campaign. The invasion was to be a colossal affair involving two separate amphibious operations, ‘Operation Olympic’, the invasion of Kyushu, the southernmost home island was scheduled for November 1945. The second phase of ‘Operation Downfall’ was the invasion ‘Operation Coronet’, of Honshu, the Kanto plain near Tokyo. This second invasion was tentatively scheduled for March 1946.  The ‘Olympic’ amphibious invasion would include just about every Allied service member already in the Pacific Theater post Okinawa operations. Over 14 Divisions of Allied forces would make the landings on Kyushu. The invasion forces would have staged out of Okinawa in the largest armada of naval shipping ever assembled in human history. The follow- on March invasion, ‘Coronet’, was planned to include upwards of 40 Divisions to be landed in stages over days.

‘Coronet’ and ‘Olympic’ each would have dwarfed the Allied invasion of continental Europe in scope and scale. The casualty estimates have been bantered about for some years and continue to be argued with proposed numbers of as little as 200,000 casualties to 500,000 and upwards to over a million. The Battle of Okinawa saw roughly 200,000 casualties including Imperial Japanese soldiers, Japanese civilians and U.S. service members. Interestingly, since Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa the number of Imperial Japanese forces defending typically equates to the number of U.S. casualties. For the defense of the Japanese home Islands, roughly 2, 000,000 members of all Imperial Japanese Armed Forces were available. Not that every one of the soldiers, sailors, and airman were properly equipped, but given their demonstrated history and proclivity for fighting to the death one can envision the Allied casualties to come.

In a 1959 interview with ‘U.S. News and World Report’, General Marshall sheds some light on the thinking at the Joint Chiefs with respect to how the atomic bombs were to be used:

In the original plans for the invasion of Japan, we wanted nine atomic bombs for three attacks. Two were to be used for each attacking army, or six in all, in the initial attack. And then we were planning on using the other three against Japanese reserves which we were sure would pour into the areas.[13]

 

The issues of the associated decision to use atomic weapons and the causes for Japan’s surrender will continue to cause debate and argument for time to come. Historiographers and historians have been drawn to this debate for a host of reasons, but the natural and attendant drama coupled with the nuanced actions and statements of the participants are all fuel for more debate. It appears, with respect to chronological time, the closer to August 1945 one is, the more ready one could support the use of the atomic weapons and easily attribute their use to forcing Japan’s surrender and expediting an end to a most horrific war. The traditionalists have provided a uniform and cohesive view of the events.

As for the revisionists a number of issues come to mind. They are the ‘skeptics’ for certain. And they were, in the 1960’s and 1970’s, possibly ‘New Left’ revisionists. Their arguments are not necessarily as cohesive as the traditionalists, but they all have argued collectively that the atomic bomb did not cause Japan to surrender.  Returning back to the chronology themes began to develop almost immediately after Japan surrendered. Thematically, the historians start with the traditionalist position that the atomic bomb was necessary and forced the surrender of Japan. Next, the revisionists denunciation of the weapon and alternatives to what caused Japan to surrender and lastly, the ‘consensus’ group of historians who straddle aspects of both the traditionalists and the revisionists.

For the ‘consensus’, avoiding moral judgement, accepting of the decisions made in 1945, but arguing the finer points such as the ‘Soviet declaration of war against Japan on August 8^th after Hiroshima but before Nagasaki’ places them squarely in the middle.  With respect to the historiography of the decisions that led to the use of the atomic weapons and the causes of Japan’s surrender, the chronology of events and the chronology of the historians and writers associated appear linked physically. Those that were trained historians in the progressive period of from the 1910’s to 1940’s were writing the history immediately in the aftermath of the largest and most horrific war humankind had ever witnessed. Although some took issues with the use of the atomic bomb, many supported its use and associate the capitulation of Japan with Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The 1950’s saw an emergence of the ‘consensus’ historians and the 1960’s saw a radical shift into ‘the New Left’ and ‘Social history’ take root.  The revisionists, however, took to task the Truman administration and the use of atomic weapons. They were and are skeptical as to the claim that the atomic bombs were necessary, saved hundreds of thousands of lives, and forced the Japanese to capitulate. The majority of the writers and historians of ‘the decision to drop the bomb’ and ‘Japan’s surrender’ are not ‘military historians’ but ‘diplomatic or political historians.’ And this is the point that historian, John Ray Skates makes.

In “The Invasion of Japan: Alternative To The Bomb” John Ray Skates acknowledges the historiographical debate that continues and laments that of the many historians consumed with this debate such as Alperovitz, Sherman and others “that these are diplomatic historians writing about diplomatic issues, and their arguments usually turn to the single issue of the bomb.”[14] For a great number of historians writing on the decision to use the atomic weapons and the cause of Japan’s surrender, the military dimension is generally left out of their arguments. With respect to ‘Operation Downfall’ and enormity of it placed alongside the pressure to end the War as quickly and bloodlessly as possible, one must see the military dimension along with the diplomatic.

 

In reviewing the beginnings of this debate, who or what started all of these historians down this road?  Emperor Hirohito made several statements himself as to his decisions to accept the Potsdam terms. “On August 14 [he] mentioned the atomic bombs and another on August 17 mentioned the Soviet entry into the war.”[15] One constant, unchanging, and unbending aspect about the decisions of August 1945 and the causes and their effects: this argument ranks as one of the greatest historiographical arguments of modern America. And it appears it shall remain so for time to come.

 

  

 

Bibliography

 

Alperovitz, Gar, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 29 December, New York: 2010.

Alperovitz, Gar, “The History of the Decision to use Atomic Bomb”, Gar Alperovitz, http://www.garalperovitz.com/atomic-bomb/, accessed on 22 January 2018.

 

Compton, Karl T., “If the Atomic Bomb Had Not Been Used”, The Atlantic, December 1946, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1946/12/if-the-atomic-bomb-had-not-been-used/376238/, accessed on 22 January 2018.

 

Ide, Derek, “Dropping the Bomb: A Historiographical Review of the Most Destructive Decision in Human History”, The Hampton Institute, June 19^th, 2014, http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/hiroshima-historiography.html#.WkUsCWYUnIU.

 

Giangreco, D.M. Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan, 1945-1947. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis: 2009.

 

Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman and the Surrender of Japan, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge: 2005

 

Kawamura, Noriko, Emperor Hirohito and the Pacific War, University of Washington Press, page 155, Seattle: 2016.

 

Sherwin, Martin J, A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and its Legacies, Stanford University Press, Stanford: 2003.

 

Skates, John Ray, The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to The Bomb, University of South Carolina Press, page 236, Columbia: 1995.

 

Stimson, Henry Lewis, “The decision to use the atomic bomb”, Harper’s Magazine, Archive, February, New York: 1947, https://harpers.org/archive/1947/02/the-decision-to-use-the-atomic-bomb/

 

Sutherland, John P., “THE STORY GEN. MARSHALL TOLD ME: Hitherto Unpublished Views on Fateful Decisions of World War II”, U.S. News & World Report 47, pages 50–56, November 2, New York: 1959.

 

Koshiro, Yukiko, “Eurasian Eclipse: Japan's End Game in World War II”, The American Historical Review, Vol. 109, No. 2, Oxford University Press (April 2004), pp. 417-444.

 

Walker, J. Samuel. Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs against Japan. University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill:  2004.

 

FOOTNOTES

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[1] Gianfranco, D.M. Transcript of "OPERATION DOWNFALL [US invasion of Japan]:  US PLANS AND JAPANESE COUNTER-MEASURES", US Army Command and General Staff College, 16 February 1998, From Beyond Bushido:  Recent Work in Japanese Military History a symposium sponsored by the Center for East Asian Studies, the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, the Office of International Programs, and the Departments of History and East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Kansas. 1998.  

[2] Stimson, Henry Lewis, “The decision to use the atomic bomb”, Harper’s Magazine, Archive, February, New

 York: 1947, https://harpers.org/archive/1947/02/the-decision-to-use-the-atomic-bomb/.

 [3] Compton, Karl T., “If the Atomic Bomb Had Not Been Used”, The Atlantic, December 1946, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1946/12/if-the-atomic-bomb-had-not-been-used/376238/.

[4] Alperovitz, Gar, “The History of the Decision to use Atomic Bomb”, Gar Alperovitz, http://www.garalperovitz.com/atomic-bomb/ , accessed on 22 January 2018.

[5] Ide, Derek, “Dropping the Bomb: A Historiographical Review of the Most Destructive Decision in Human History”, The Hampton Institute, 19 June, 2014 accessed on 22 January 2018.

[6] Alperovitz, Gar, “The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb”, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 29 December, 2010.

[7] Sherwin, Martin J, “A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and its Legacies”, Stanford University Press, 2003

[8] Ibid.

[9] Walker, J. Samuel, “Prompt and Utter Destruction” Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs against Japan”, Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1997, 96-97.

[10] Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi, “Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan”, Harvard University Press, 2009, p.3.

[11] Kawamura, Noriko, “Emperor Hirohito and the Pacific War”, University of Washington Press, 2016, 155.

[12] Ibide.

[13] Sutherland, John P., “THE STORY GEN. MARSHALL TOLD ME: Hitherto Unpublished Views on Fateful Decisions of World War II U.S. News & World Report 47, November 2, 1959,  50–56.

[14] Skates, John Ray, “The Invasion of Japan: Alternative To The Bomb”, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia: 1995, 236.

[15] Koshiro, Yukiko, “Eurasian Eclipse: Japan's End Game in World War II”,  The American Historical Review, Vol. 109, No. 2 (April 2004), pp. 417-444.