Biographical Study: MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION K.K. ROKOSSOVSKY AND THE BATTLES OF STALINGRAD AND KURSK

 

Biographical Study: 

MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION K.K. ROKOSSOVSKY AND THE BATTLES OF STALINGRAD AND KURSK

Introduction

The German Army Group Center had been the bane of the Russian Stavka (staff) across the Eastern Front during the Russo-German War (1941-1945). Of the three Army Groups the Germans had invaded Russia with in 1941, the Center was an incredibly powerful and highly mobile organization. And due to its geographical focus, it was the most threatening and could strike for Moscow or reinforce Army Groups North and South.

Army Group Center had been commanded by Generals Fedor von Bock, Gunther von Kluge, Gunther Blumentritt, Ernst Busch, Walter Model, and Georg Hans Reinhardt to name a few. Their subordinate Commanders included such figures as Heinz Guderian, Herman Hoth, Gotthard Heinrici, Werner Kempf, and Eric Hoepner.

During ‘Operation Bagration’ in 1944, as the Red Army marched west, the Stavka (Russian General Staff) finally had the resources to tackle Army Group Center. The Soviets would assemble an incredible array of tanks, assault guns, artillery, and close air support aircraft to challenge the scourge that was Army Group Center. Opposing Army Group Center would be five Soviet Fronts.

The 1st Belorussian Front, in the van and commanded by General Rokossovski, would tackle the nemesis of the Soviet Union and the Red Army. An interesting story has been conveyed by numerous historians of the Russo-German war regarding the character and principles of Marshal Rokossovsky.

In the May 1944 planning conference for ‘Operation Bagration,’ the massive Red Army plan to destroy Army Group Center and push on into Poland, Rokossovsky proposed a double thrusted attack by the 1st Belorussian Front that would converge on Berezina, Belarus.

Apparently, Stalin was none too pleased and wanted a single hammer blow across the Dnepr bridgehead. He ordered Rokossovsky out of the conference room to think it over. This Rokossovsky did. Rokossovsky, upon re-entry was asked what he thought and he again requested his double thrust. Stalin ordered him out again. This time others went with him to include Molotov and Malenkov. Everyone attempted to talk sense into Rokossovsky as he was disagreeing with none other than Joseph Stalin! “After the third presentation of his ‘report’, Rokossovsky had convinced Stalin.”[1]

 

Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky

Marshal Konstantine Konstantinovich Rokossovsky, Hero of the Soviet Union (twice), seven Orders of Lenin, six Orders of the Red Banner, and recipient of the Orders of Kutuzov and Suvurov was a Red Army commander during World War II and fought throughout the Russo-German War as a commander of armored and combined arms formations from Corps to Army and Front (a grouping of three to five Armies).

Rokossoovsky was “considered by many senior wartime German commanders as the Red Army’s best general.”[2]  Rokossovsky was a rare personality among his peers in the Red Army. All the Soviet Generals who had survived both the Russo-German war and Stalin had the traits of a ‘survivor.’ But Rokossovsky was known among superiors, peers, and most importantly, subordinates, as a man who embodied the professional ethos of a professional soldier; an officer who was physically impressive, competent, and self-effacing.

“The Deputy Supreme Commander in Chief of the Red Army, Marshal G Zhukov , the Commander of the 21st Army Group, Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, Marshal Sokolovsky (behind Rokossovsky) and General K Rokossovsky of the Red Army leave the Brandenburg Gate after the ceremony.”[3]

 

Rokossovsky was of Polish origins. Born in Warsaw into a family of nobility and enlisted in the Russian Army during World War I. He served as a common cavalryman in the ‘Great War’ and later, as an officer in the Civil War against White Russia. Rokossovsky commanded at the Squadron, Battalion, Regiment, and Brigade level before attending the Frunze Military Academy. He fought, in 1929, in the Sino-Soviet conflict in Manchuria. He went on to command at the Division level and “in 1937 he was arrested on charges of ‘sabotage’ and ‘impairing combat effectiveness.”[4] This was during the height of ‘Stalin’s Purges’ where many Army, Corps, Division and Brigade commanders were collected up across Soviet Russia for interrogation, imprisonment or worse. Rokossovsky was held in prison for over three years, brutally tortured, and yet, never confessed. The charges were trumped up, as was often the case, and he was released and returned to active service as the 5th Corps Commander.

During the Russo-German war, Roksossovsky commanded at Corps level and above. He first took his Corps through the Ukraine during the initial first year of the war demonstrating an aggressive spirit even though his counterattacks proved “fruitless.”[5] He fought at the Battles of Moscow and Smolensk and then, led his “Don Front” in 1942 against the 6th German Army in Stalingrad. After his success at Stalingrad, Rokossovsky led an offensive west of Kursk. Although, unsuccessful in the period between the victory of Stalingrad and on the eve of Kursk, he gained an intimate understanding of the Kursk area of operations. This understanding he would use against Model and his 9th Army in July 1943.

For his previous commands at Front level coupled with his aforementioned knowledge of the Kursk are, Rokossovsky was selected by Marshal Zhukov as “the ideal commander to defend the northern sector of the Kursk bulge.”[6]

 

 

 

Stalingrad

The summer of 1942 saw the German Army, although denied a single and decisive campaign in the preceding year, occupy vast swaths of territory across Russia. From the Baltic states in the North running south through Belarus on to the Ukraine, ‘Operation Barbarossa’ had delivered incredible territorial gains and captured hundreds of thousands of Red Army soldiers. The German armored formations, backed up by close air support from the various Luftwaffe air groups, had chewed up Red Army formations in rapid succession. The summer of 1942 saw the Germans consolidate their gains and begin to focus south after their failed attempts to invest Leningrad and Moscow. Rokossovsky, who had fought hard and lost much during the Battle of Moscow went on to comment in his memoirs: “we understood that the war, in its essence, had only just begun, that our victory in this grandiose battle before Moscow where forces of three fronts had participated, was a paradigm shift in the course of the entire war, that this victory had accorded us breathing space, which we needed as much as air itself.”[7]

The Battle of Stalingrad saw the absolute destruction of the German 6th Army under General von Paulus. The battle began on 23 August 1942 and formerly ended with the 6th Army’s surrender on 2 February 1943. The Germans lost over 250,000 men and it was Rokossovsky that led the encirclement. The ‘Don Front’ under Rokossovsky, prepared the encirclement operation, ‘Operation Uranus’, and deftly surrounded the entire 6th Army in November 1942. The 6th Army possessed upwards of 250,000 soldiers that included Germany’s allies from Italy, Romania, and Hungary.

‘Operation Ring’ was planned once the 6th Army was surrounded and it was Rokossovsky who proposed the division of the Stalingrad ‘cauldron’ between a North and South zones. “One crucial element in the success was a pragmatic approach to the critical problem of senior command and control.”[8]

Rokossovsky had to constantly impose authority while simultaneously identifying and supporting competent subordinate commanders. This he did in the chaos of Stalingrad. Both ‘Operations Uranus and Ring’ were successful. Rokossovsky had been at the center of both but it was the average Red Army soldier who had gained victory but at a terrible price as “the ruins of Stalingrad were the icon of Red Army stoicism.”[9]

In Rokossovsky, one can immediately see the stoicism required of any Soviet commander given the climate created by the Political Commissars, the NKVD, and most importantly, Stalin himself.

 

Map 1: Rokossovsky’s Encirclement of German 6th Army at Stalingrad. “Operation Uranus” November 1942.[10]

 

Kursk

With the defeat of the 6th Army and the halting of German ambitions towards the Caucuses, the Heer (German Army) refocused on shortening its lines on the Eastern Front in order to better concentrate combat power. The shortening of the lines would free up numerous units which then would be available for further decisive operations. Most importantly, the strategic and political fallout of the loss at Stalingrad had major consequences with respect to the German Axis allies. Romania, Hungary, and Italy had taken incredible losses during Stalingrad. The weaker axis allies were contemplating an exit from continued commitments to the Eastern Front.

A victory at Kursk would have several ramifications. Firstly, it would maintain the initiative on behalf of the German Army. It was hopes as well, that a decisive defeat of the Red Army units in the Kursk salient would provide numerous Russian prisoners which would be forced into augmenting the labor shortages across the German armaments industry. Secondly, a decisive victory would also demonstrate to friends and foe alike that Germany was still incredibly strong and that her prestige was maintained.

The battle of Kursk began on 5 July 1943 and terminated on 23 August 1943. The operations plan was named ‘Fall Zitadelle’ (‘Operation Citadel’). To many historians, the defeat or collapse of the German offensive at Kursk marked the hand-over of the offensive and initiative from the Germans to the Soviets.

Map 2: Battle of Kursk and Vicinity, July 1943.[11]

 

            The Stavka and the Red Army Front commanders had gained much experience during the terrible carnage that was the 1941-1942 fighting. Post-Stalingrad, the Stavka desiring a winter offensive, had matured and elected to await the Germans next move. The bulge or salient, that was Kursk, afforded the Red Army the opportunity to defend in depth, thereby attriting the German armor and thus, counterattack.

            The results of the first few days in the north (Rokossovsky’s operational area) “had gone largely as the Stavka and Rokossovsky had anticipated.”[12] Much was sacrificed in Soviet Armor and personnel. But Russia had plenty of both to replace and rebuild. Rokossovsky had played an instrumental part in holding the northern portion of the Kursk salient and would lead the ‘Central Front’ (formerly ‘Don Front’) in the enormous counterattack. His particular area north of Kursk had held out against Model’s 9th Army. “Of the two arms, which were meant to converge across a sixty mile base of the salient, Model’s had fared worse.”[13] A testament to bad luck, a very well prepared and rehearsed defense, and most importantly, an equal to the tactical and operational task; Rokossovsky.

           

Red Army Victory Parade Moscow 1945

            Rokossovsky would eventually lead the Central Front into Poland and after the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, push his Armies into Germany. Zhukov would beat him to Berlin. But then, Rokossovsky would stand shoulder to shoulder with him at the ‘Soviet Victory Parade in Moscow’. The parade in Moscow was set for 24 June, 1945. Stalin would see the greatest parade in Russian history and he selected his senior two Marshals to represent the Red Army; Marshal Georgy Zhukov and Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky. The salute would be received by Marshal Zhukov, who was actually Rokossovky’s junior and had served under him at one time. For those who knew both men, many said “Zhukov was tougher, Rokossovsky smarter.”[14]

The parade commander, however, among all of the other Marshals in the Red Army, would be none other than Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky. Rokossovky “whose torture, humiliation, survival, resilience, and ultimate military greatness mirrored the experience of Soviet Russia herself.”[15]  Zhukov would ride a white Arab stallion while Rukossovsky rode a black. Their relationship remained intertwined in the post-war period and both saw their fortunes rise and fall with the death of Stalin.

            For all that Rokossovksy had accomplished it is of little surprise that his German opposites knew of him and had their own appraisal of his skill and competence. Rokossovksy “would become known to the Germans who called him ‘the dagger’ and he was the most tactically deft commander in the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War.”[16]

 

Selected Bibliography

Bellamy, Chris Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War, New York: Random House Vintage Books, 2007

 

Clark, Alan Barbarossa, New York: Quill, 1965

 

Erickson, John The Road to Berlin, London: Cassell Military Paperbacks, 1983

 

 

Glantz, David M. and House, Jonathan M The Battle of Kursk, Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1999

 

Merridale, Catherine Ivan’s War: Life and Death in the Red Army 1939-1945, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006

 

Pleshakov, Constantine Stalin’s Folly: The Tragic First Ten Days of WWII on the Eastern Front, New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2005

 

Woff,Richard  “Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky”, in Stalin’s Generals ed Harold Shukman,New York: Grove Press, 1993 p. 177-196

 

 

Photographs

War Museum, Imperial “Field Marshal Montgomery decorates Russian generals at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, Germany, 12 July 1945”, War Office official photographer, Ministry Of Information Second World War Colour Transparency Collection, TR2913, https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205189188, accessed on 1 September, 2018

 

 Maps

 

Map#1 United States Military Academy, Department of History. “World War II European Theater” Map: Battle of Stalingrad, West Point New York: https://www.westpoint.edu/history/SiteAssets/SitePages/World%20War%20II%20Europe/WWIIEurope23b.gif

 

Map#2 United States Military Academy, Department of History. “World War II European Theater” Map: Battle of Stalingrad, West Point New York: https://www.westpoint.edu/history/SiteAssets/SitePages/World%20War%20II%20Europe/WWIIEurope27Combined.gif

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



[1] Erickson, John The Road to Berlin, London: Cassell Military Paperbacks: 1983, p.203

[2] Woff,Richard  “Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky”, in Stalin’s Generals ed Harold Shukman, New York: Grove Press, 1993 p. 179

[3] War Museum, Imperial “Field Marshal Montgomery decorates Russian generals at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, Germany, 12 July 1945”, War Office official photographer, Ministry Of Information Second World War Colour Transparency Collection, TR2913, https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205189188

[4] Glantz, David and House, Jonathan M The Battle of Kursk, Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1999, p.45

[5] Ibid. p.46

[6] Ibid. p.46

[7] Bellamy, Chris Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War, New York: Random House Vintage Books, 2007

[8] Woff,Richard  “Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky”, in Stalin’s Generals ed Harold Shukman, New York: Grove Press, 1993 p. 179

[9] Merridale, Catherine Ivan’s War: Life and Death in the Red Army 1939-1945, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006, p. 171

[10] United States Military Academy, Department of History. “World War II European Theater” Map: Battle of Stalingrad, West Point New York: https://www.westpoint.edu/history/SiteAssets/SitePages/World%20War%20II%20Europe/WWIIEurope23b.gif

[11] United States Military Academy, Department of History. “World War II European Theater” Map: Battle of Stalingrad, West Point New York: https://www.westpoint.edu/history/SiteAssets/SitePages/World%20War%20II%20Europe/WWIIEurope27Combined.gif

[12] Glantz, David M. and House, Jonathan M The Battle of Kursk, Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1999 p.147

[13] Clark, Alan Barbarossa, New York: Quill, 1965, p.333
[14] Pleshakov, Constantine Stalin’s Folly: The Tragic First Ten Days of WWII on the Eastern Front, New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2005

[15] Bellamy, Chris Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War, New York: Random House Vintage Books, 2007, p.672

[16] Ibid. p.673

 


 

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