BOOK REVIEW: The Hardest Victory: RAF Bomber Command in the Second World War
BOOK REVIEW: The Hardest Victory: RAF Bomber Command in the Second World War
By Denis Richards
OBE
During the Second World War the Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber
Command conducted an ‘area
bombing’ offensive against Germany. Post-World
War II, RAF Bomber Command and the ‘area bombing’
campaign underwent close scrutiny and has been the subject of continued post-war
criticism for its ‘immorality,’ as hundreds of thousands civilians were killed. Further, the RAF bombing
offensive has also been considered ‘wasteful,’ as thousands
and thousands of tons of bombs were dropped on many targets that critics have
claimed were not military in nature.
In The Hardest Victory,
Denis Richards provides a clear, precise and cogent counter-argument to the
criticisms of RAF Bomber Command that is both informing and forcefully
effective. Richards contends that the RAF bombing offensive was simply a matter
of capability at the time and that, in order to mitigate the threat of a
potential German invasion of England, the RAF was the only service capable of
an offensive strike against the heart of Germany. Winston Churchill addressed
the Cabinet colleagues on 3 September 1940 and stated “We must therefore develop the power to carry an ever increasing
volume of explosive to Germany, so as to pulverize the entire industry and
scientific structure on which the war effort and economic life of the enemy
depend, while holding him at arm’s length from our island…”[1] Thus, the RAF bomber campaign was on.
Denis Richards OBE, was a distinguished historian for the Royal Air
Force during the Second World War. He was a graduate of Cambridge University,
having majored in History. During the Second World War be worked in the RAF
Historical Section and started what would eventually be the official history of
the RAF during the War. After publication of the three volume set of the The RAF Official History 1939-1945,
Richards taught at Morley College and Sussex University before he retired to
full time writing.
In The Hardest Victory,
published in 1994, Richards lays out the history and formation of Bomber
Command, from pre-war organization to rapid expansion once the war began. He
also highlights the challenges, obstacles, and difficulties experienced by the
RAF as it set about to create an offensive arm with which to strike Germany.
Richards also acknowledges and addresses the debates between the RAFs ‘area bombing’ techniques
compared against the USAAF ‘precision
bombing’ techniques. The Hardest Victory presents a thorough narrative that is richly
detailed and balanced as he conveys the sacrifice of the Bomber Command aircrew
and personnel during the Second World War and the ‘Combined Bomber Offensive.’
The main argument in The Hardest Day addresses two main criticisms of the RAF Bomber
Command in its campaign against Germany from 1939 to 1945. Richards effectively
argues that Bomber Command was incredibly successful in the collective, and
that the morality of the selected ‘area bombing’ technique must be weighed
against other techniques used during the Second World War. In 1940, for
example, the RAF attempted daylight precision bombing. The results were
disastrous due to incredible aircraft and crew losses and the continued attacks
in daylight would spell doom for the Bomber Command, the only offensive weapon
England had against Germany. Subsequently, the night approach was selected on
clear moonlit nights for precision. In time, this would evolve into ‘area
bombing,’ eg simply attacking a wide area in an industrial or factory town.
The Hardest Day was written
specifically as a counter-argument to the post-war criticisms of Bomber
Commands ‘area bombing’ techniques executed over Germany from 1941 to 1945.
Much of the post-war writing, especially by revisionists in the late 1960s to
the 1980s, was severe criticisms of the RAF approach as the results were
wanting, with respect to industrial targets and the number of civilians killed.
Richards provides excellent analysis and supporting statistical data to support
his argument. His most effective argument, with respect to the moral questions
associated is that the results of Bomber Commands sorties against the Ruhr and
industrial Germany pale in comparison to the destruction wrought on Tokyo,
Nagasaki, and Hiroshima.
Richards tackles the subject of the RAFs
Bomber Command chronologically with rich details that include first person
narrative, technical data and accompanying photographs of each aircraft type used
during each phase of the bomber campaign against Germany. Also included is an
outstanding appendix with chronological dates, order of battle, and
explanations of bombs and bombsights.
The Hardest Victory finishes with an
exceptionally honest discussion revolving around the debate on ‘area bombing.’
Richards provides an incredibly clear picture of the effects of ‘area bombing’
and its disappointing results when compared against that of the USAAFs
‘precision bombing’ results captured in the post-war USAAF ‘Strategic Bombing
Survey.’
However, what Richards provides in The Hardest Victory is some detailed
insights on the task and decisions that faced Great Britain, the Royal Air
Force, and the fledgling Bomber Command, at the start of the Second World War.
The RAF’s Fighter Command was solely responsible for the defense of Great
Britain in 1939 and 1940. Once the threat of German invasion was contained, it
was Bomber Command whose shoulders bore the burden of the only ‘offensive’
campaign to be undertaken against Germany proper from 1940 to 1945.
Bibliography
Richards, Denis, The Hardest
Victory: RAF Bomber Command in the Second World War, Norton and Company,
New York: 1994
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