Generals Lee, Sherman, And Grant: The Tactical vs the Strategic

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Generals Lee, Sherman, And Grant: The Tactical vs the Strategic


General Tecumseh Sherman has been memorialized for his “March to the Sea,” the carnage wrought upon Georgia from November to December of 1864. This campaign was the culmination of his own unique strategy, developed as a subordinate of General Grant, and as a student of his own successes and failings during the three previous years of campaigning against the Confederacy.

Sherman had seen Grants magnificence in the Vicksburg campaign in 1863. Grant had all but abandoned his logistics columns and supply lines after they were destroyed by Confederate Cavalry. Undeterred, Grant continued. Sherman modeled this concept during his own “Meridian” Campaign in Mississippi.

Sherman is more remembered for his Armies ‘March to the Sea’, burning and wrecking most of Georgia along the way. “He fought in the battles at Shiloh, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga with mixed results, but he is the only man to twice receive the thanks of Congress during the war: once for his actions at Chattanooga and again for capturing Atlanta and Savannah.”[1]

As for General Ulysses Grant, he is more remembered for the shortcomings of his presidency. However, unlike the charismatic Lee, Grant was solid strategically. Much more so than Lee. Grant happens to be an opposite image of Lee. “He seemed to know only one tactic – the frontal assault.”[2]

Grant sacrificed his men often on frontal attacks knowing the Union had manpower to replace them. Worse, Grant is believed to have seriously underappreciated the technology of arms. Rifles brought havoc on any frontal attack. Nevertheless Grant persisted and only tried one ‘flanking’ attack at Chattanooga. But strategically Grant was the mind behind the Northern (Union) scheme and concept of total war against the Confederacy.


Lee, unlike Grant, was the better tactically. And his image is preserved romantically, Lee, loved by his troops, bold, audacious, aggressive and completely offensive minded. Lee was good defensively but a genius tactically. That the war carried on for four years can be attributed to the ability of Lee to engage, withdraw, attack and move along to attack again.

Of General Lee the following is an excellent example of the romantic history associated to him:

He scored outrageous victories against the Army of the Potomac up until Gettysburg 1863, fighting against superior numbers and better supplied troops. His victory at Chancellorsville, where he divided his army three times in the face of the enemy while being outnumbered three to one, is a master class in the use of speed and maneuver as a force multiplier.[3]

But, like Grant, Lee also had shortcomings. And his was: Strategy. The very opposite of Grant. Lee could fight anywhere against anyone and generally win. More often than not he decisively won. But Lee couldn’t see the bigger picture. Given all that was against the Confederate plans, a short sharp war, suing for peace. Holding off the Union etc Lee could not see that if he had guarded and husbanded his combat power to fight another day. To feint, to delay, to prolong; the very things Lee avoided. “Grant recognize[d] the new reality of warfare: that the firepower commanded by each side was making a battle of maneuver, like Chancellorsville, impossible.”[4]

Lee also had another flaw; logistics. Lee hadn’t given it much   thought. He believed his men, who could hardly be replaced   at numbers like the Northern Armies, had to also forage and   live off the land. And their suffering only increased as the   constant campaigning took its toll.

 Lee’s major shortcoming; strategic thought, can also be   blamed on his fixation of Virginia, all things Virginia, whereas Grant saw the entire war from a much more realistic   strategy.

 In the end, however much and deservedly loved General   Robert E. Lee is, Lee never did beat Grant. He surrendered to him.

 

 

 

 

[1] Py-Liberman, Beth and Ward, David C, “Which General Was Better? Ulysses S. Grant or Robert E. Lee?,” The Smithsonian.Com, August 2015, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/which-general-was-better-ulysses-s-grant-or-robert-e-lee-180952005/#v0bf78uzSJDriS5r.99 accessed on 24 March 2018

[2] Ibid.

[3] Zeiser, Dan, “Grant vs. Lee”, The Cleveland Civil War Roundtable, 2008, http://clevelandcivilwarroundtable.com/articles/military/grant_lee.htm accessed on 24 March 2018

[4] Foster, Buck T. “General William Tecumseh Sherman”, History.Net, from Sherman’s Mississippi Campaign University of Alabama Press, 2006, and Military History Quarterly, Summer 2007, http://www.historynet.com/general-william-tecumseh-sherman, accessed 24 March 2018

 

Comments

  1. jMarch 9, 2022 at 7:14 PM

    Very well-done Pappy.
    Of course, one cannot rule out the role chance played in the war and in all wars for that matter. What may have happened had Jackson not been taken out in 1863 and Stuart in 1864? The creation of the North's massive logistics system that supported the projection of its armies certainly helped Grant and Sherman as did the naval blockade of the Confederacy.

    ReplyDelete

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