SHORT PAPER: The Allied Bombing of Germany: Its Underappreciated Importance to Victory in Europe
SHORT PAPER: The Allied Bombing of Germany: Its Underappreciated
Importance to Victory in Europe
While German industrial
capacity actually increased during the heaviest period of the Allies “Combined
Bomber Offensive’ (CBO) in World War II, the CBO was tremendously effective because it disrupted communications
and transport networks, tied down Luftwaffe fighters which were
husbanded in defense of the home front, and tied down almost 1 million
personnel across Germany.
The Allied bombing offensive, also known as the ‘Combined Bomber Offensive,’ (CBO) conducted by the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the United States
Army Air Force (USAAF), was an attempt at primarily, crippling the German ‘Luftwaffe’ followed up with the secondary targeting of Germany’s principle industrial centers of war making with oil being the
highest priority target. At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 the
Combined Chiefs of Staff laid out the strategic directive for the Allied Air
Offensive:
Your primary object will be the
progressive destruction of the German military, industrial and economic system,
and undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where there armed
resistance is fatally weakened.[1]
The directive was quite general in nature and afforded the
commanders, Harris of RAF Bomber Command, and Eaker of the USAAF, wide latitude
and initiative. Subsequently, Bomber Command focused on industrial ‘areas’ that
had the byproduct of potentially demoralizing the German factory laborers. The
USAAF concentrated on Luftwaffe
assets such as fighter production, aircraft engine and component manufacturing
and railyards. But before 1943 and the Allied Conference in Casablanca,
Morocco, RAF Bomber Command attacked Germany alone. And in those early years,
many tough lessons were learned and much was sacrificed.
The Early
Years: RAF Bomber Command All Alone
Bomber Command had hoped for the eventual delivery of 4,000 bombers
with which to destroy Germany. In late 1939 Bomber Command had less than 350
assigned aircraft due to sending Squadrons to RAF Coastal Command, North
Africa, and the Far East. And precision aiming instruments and navigation were
hopelessly under-developed for the war that would come.
During the Battle of Britain, RAF Bomber Command was the only
organization capable of mounting offensive strikes against the Germany. Early
efforts revealed inefficiencies, ineffective or incapable aircraft, and the
results were less than satisfactory against the targets selected. Bomber
Command, recognizing the issues, elected a strategy that was focused on ‘area bombing’
techniques and subsequently concentrated on night area bombing. The USAAF Eighth
Air Force, arrived in England all through 1942, and as they gained strength and
became operational, they completely focused on daylight ‘precision’
bombing techniques with their ‘Norden’ bombsight.
The RAF Bomber Command at first, committed large numbers of twin
engine medium bombers such as the Vickers Wellington, Handley Page Hampden, and
Armstrong Whitworth Whitley. These medium bombers proved obsolete or
insufficient for the task. Through hard fought lessons learned, RAF Bomber
Command developed the Shorts Stirling, Avro Lancaster and the Handley Page
Halifax, four engine heavy bombers. The USAAF deployed a host of light and
medium bombers for tactical work whilst deploying the Boeing B-17 Super
Fortress and Consolidated B-24 Liberator heavy four engine bombers for ‘precision’
daylight bombing of Germany proper.
Early RAF bombing missions against Germany in December of 1939 were
mostly daylight sorties with medium twin engine types. The results were
shocking to the RAF and Bomber Command. “The main conclusion from the disastrous daylight raid on 18
December 1939 was inescapable: the loss rate was ten times the level Bomber
Command had estimated it could afford.”[2]
The Bomber Command attempts of late 1939 saw a series of medium
twin engine bombers execute daylight, unescorted, and low level attacks against
German shipping. “On 4
September, 7 of 29 Blenheims and Wellingtons were lost; on 29 September, 5 out
of 11 Hampdens; and on 14 December, 5 out of 12 Wellingtons.”[3] The loss rates would render Bomber Command combat ineffective and,
as the only arm capable of mounting an offensive against Germany proper, this
was unacceptable. Consequently, Bomber Command elected to operate at night.
Difficulties ensued with nighttime operations as precision was all but
impossible. Especially on moonless nights or against targets that were heavily
defended by searchlights and anti-aircraft artillery.
The decisions made during the inter-war years and in the first year
of the Second World War would resonate for the remainder of the war. Area
Bombing was not a novelty of a hard pressed air arm but a technique within a
strategy that Douhet, the Italian Airpower theorist and advocate, had written
of during and after World War I. Douhet first presented his theories in his
work, Command of the Air, which he theorizes
that strategic bombers could play a most decisive part in winning wars. He also
laid out the targeting for bombers, such as industrial targets, ports,
government buildings and military forces. Within Command of the Air, he discusses not only attacking industry and
government, but the ‘will’ of the people. Douhet was an advocate of ‘total war’ and
believed that once war began, all targets were fair game. This included
civilians as they were seen as a ‘resource.’
Armies and Air Forces were built of its citizens. And it was the civilian
laborer who manufactured the weapons of war. Many of the Air Forces after the
First World War grew in maturity and studied the best and most practical use of
this new strategy; airpower. The Royal Air Force and Bomber Command were no
exception; having developed light and medium bombers in the 1920’s and 1930’s they
then theorized how best to use them. The ‘area bombing’
strategy was studied and adopted given the limitations of the technology
associated with navigation and precision aiming. The proponents and executors
of the Bombing Campaign had all studied both the American, Billy Mitchell and
the Italian, Giulio Douhet. The RAF and USAAF Bomber commanders would strive to
implement Douhet’s and
Mitchell’s strategies.
The Allied
Bombing Decision Makers
The key personalities and figures associated with the ‘Combined Bomber Offensive’ included Generals Carl Spaatz (commander of the Eighth Air Force
and eventually ‘Strategic
Air Forces Europe), Ira Eaker (the author of the CBO campaign plan), Henry ‘Hap’
Arnold (commander of the Army Air Force) and Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles
Portal (who led Bomber Command and eventually led the RAF), Air Chief Marshal
Sir Arthur ‘Bomber’ Harris (who led Bomber Command). Of these personalities, they all
shared a belief in the effectiveness of airpower and would press hard for the
aggressive use of their organizations in the day and night bombing raids across
Germany. The various leaders were also attentive to their own Air Force
prescriptions for success against Germany. Bomber Command would implement the
area bombing campaign at night. And the USAAF would deliver massed daylight
aerial bombardment against Germany with its multi-engine, long range, Norden
equipped bombers.
Both President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill supported the
Allied bombing offensive. At the very least they thought it would, perhaps, buy
time until a serious land campaign on the continent could be mounted. Politically,
it helped appease Stalin and the Soviets who were expending enormous resources
holding down the Wehrmacht in the
East. But in order to buy time, Bomber Command, and later, the USAAF, would
have to tackle targeting Germany’s spread out industry and learn to negotiate the inhospitable skies
above a defended land. All while learning to navigate massive bomber streams
from cloudy England to the ever changing weather patterns of Northern Europe.
Targeting and
its Evolution
Early targeting was developed by the RAF Bomber Command and
concentrated on industrial centers to little effect. In order to address both,
navigation issues, and targeting issues, Bomber Command relooked at target
locations, navigational aids, and developed best practices. Area Bombing would
lessen the burden on new bomber navigators. Easy reference points would be
adopted from existing German terrain, architecture, and city lay outs. And
eventually, the RAF would use target marking aircraft such as the De Havilland
Mosquito, to fly ahead of the bomber streams, and acting as a ‘Pathfinder,’ lay
out trails for the navigators and pilots to follow.
Once the USAAF arrived,
General ‘Hap’ Arnold and the Eighth Air Force developed a strategy leveraging
the capability of the multi-engine long range bombers and early operations were
all based out of England. In addition, the Fifteenth Air Force arrived in Italy
during 1943-1944 and the Bomber Offensive began to yield results, especially
against communications and transportation targets. The Americans had paid
particular attention to the misfortunes and early errors of the RAF. But this
is not to say the Americans ‘had
learned’ those lessons, rather, they ‘observed’ and
executed without implementing RAF recommended tactics and suggestions. Thus,
for the USAAF, 1943 was a baptism by fire with some difficult weeks and heavy
losses for the new American long-range bombers.
American military-industry had provided their four engine long-range
bombers with an incredible bomb sight; the Norden. This sight offered the USAAF
a very real potential for ‘precision
bombing.’ The Norden bombsight, when tested
in peacetime conditions, was affording the ‘circular error probable’ (CEP: measurement of precision for weapons systems) of 75 meters.
This was fantastical given the variables utilized. In wartime conditions the
CEP expanded but was well within 1,000 feet of the aim point. The USAAF, with
its new B-17 Super Fortresses and B-24 Liberator four-engine bombers, equipped
with the Norden Mark XV bombsight, elected to wage its campaign against Germany
in daylight, concentrating on ‘precision
targets.’
The Luftwaffe: Luftflotte Reich and the ‘Kammhuber Line’
Awaiting the bomber streams of Bomber Command and the 8th
Air Force was an air defense network that took time in the making. The Luftwaffe, and especially its fighter
commanders, were culturally inculcated in a doctrine of the offensive. German
BF-109 squadrons were ‘hunters’ by nature. They had sizable success across the Low Countries,
Poland, north Africa and during the Battle of Britain in 1940. Defending the
skies above Germany was not necessarily, the position with which the Luftwaffe wished for. Earlier successes
had been associated with offensives and in support of the Wehrmacht.
Within the Luftwaffe, the
Jagdwaffe (Fighter Force) provided
groups and squadrons in Western Europe, Norway, north Africa, the
Mediterranean, and in Russia. As such, it was tremendously overstretched. Air
Defense of the Reich was the responsibility of the Luftflotte (Air Fleet) Reich.
Within this Air Fleet, the Luftwaffe
assigned fighter squadrons, anti-aircraft artillery, search lights, and early
warning radar. As the war progressed, so too did the air defense network in
Germany.
The ‘Kammhuber Line’ was the night air defense network specifically established to
defend against the RAF Bomber Command’s night campaigns across Germany. General Kammhuber, General of
Night Fighters, established an interdiction zone across northern Germany and
the Low Countries with accompanying searchlights, sound locators, anti-aircraft
artillery, and radar equipped night fighters. At the height of German night
fighter operations, no more than “350 fighters”[4] were ever assigned. Despite their low numbers, the Luftwaffe night fighters would take a
tremendous toll on Bomber Command.
As for daytime defenses against the USAAF, the Luftwaffe had a robust defense arrayed against the Allied bomber
streams. By September 1943 “8,876
of Germany’s excellent 88-mm guns… supported by a further 24,500 light flak guns, 7,000 searchlights”[5] and an additional 300-400 Luftwaffe
day fighters were available to meet the Combined Bomber Offensive.
RAF Bomber
Command and the USAAF: Different Techniques
When comparing the RAF Bomber Command’s area bombing approach with that selected by the USAAF’s precision bombing approach, area bombing receives tremendous
criticism as it targeted cities. Many have argued that the USAAFs precision
bombing techniques were far more effective. However, as historian Anthony
Verrier argued in The Bomber Offensive
in 1968, “the terms ‘area bombing,’ ‘precision bombing,’ and ‘selective bombing’ are
misleading, because they imply absolutes.”[6] Bomber Command targeted cities for certain, whereas the USAAF made
every attempt to target specific points within or on the outskirts of cities
that were directly associated with military manufacturing.
However, an important element is often glossed over, when comparing
Bomber Command with the USAAF. Bomber Command was the principal force
associated with mounting anything ‘offensive’ in
nature between the years of 1939 to 1943. Further, Bomber Command was far more
capable of operating at night, and by 1944 was fully utilizing at least three
navigational and blind bombing aids such as GEE, ‘Oboe,’ and
H2S. The USAAF in 1943 was essentially a ‘fair weather’
bomber force; they possessed the very fine Norden bombsight which required
clear line of sight from the bomb aimer to the release point and associated
targets. Of note, the Roosevelt administration shared (Lend Lease) tremendous
amounts of material, aircraft, tanks, and other sundry items. But they did not
ever share the Norden bombsight with their British ‘friends.’
The Alliance often mutually supported one another and would hit the
same targets at different times in a given period. But Bomber Command
maintained its independence and Harris was not inclined to deviate from the ‘area bombing’
technique nor the strategy of destroying German cities and ‘dehousing’ the
laborers of essential German war making industry. 8th Air Force, by
May 1944, had begun a campaign against German synthetic fuel and oil[7]. Bomber
Command and the USAAF were redirected in June 1944 towards targets in Western
Europe. Much to the dismay of Harris, Bomber Command was to siphon off whole
Bomber Groups to hit French railways and Belgian ports. Harris would
begrudgingly hit the targets mandated with the intent to return to the ‘area bombing’ of
German cities. And 8th Air Force would return to its ‘oil campaign.
Operation
Overlord: D-Day Preparations
Allied airpower was fully committed to the preparations for Operation Overlord, the Allied landings
in Normandy France during June 1944. It was during this ‘re-missioning period’ that the Allied Bomber Offensive, however much their Commanders
believed in concomitant strategic theories of employing bombers, realized they
really were in a supporting effort and not the main effort; this would solely
be the purview of the Allied Ground Forces. Berlin was avoided during this
preparatory period and targets were selected across Western Europe in order to
assist Overlord.
The Combined Bomber Offensive was ostensibly, an insurance policy
for the Normandy landings. The 8th Air Force and Bomber Command
would reorient its priority targets to those that would hinder the planned
landings on the European continent. Both the USAAF and Bomber Command were
against taking pressure off of Germany in order to strike railroads and
communication centers in France. However, they obliged as ordered and the
results were significantly beneficial to the Allied ground forces. The targets
selected included the French and Belgian transportation and communications
networks. As the attack on petroleum centers was the focus of the USAAF, they
bombed the French rail system when weather prohibited daylight attacks of
German petroleum centers. 15th Air Force, operating out of Italy
would strike petroleum targets in Romania and Bomber Command would attack
railyards and marshaling centers for a two week period. “Attacks on the rail system in western France were particularly
effective, and by mid-June it had ceased to operate.”[8]
Once D-Day had proven successful, Bomber Command and the USAAF
returned to its bombing campaigns. A further directive amending the Casablanca
Allied Air Campaign strategy was issued. Titled Pointblank, it prioritized the targets with the number one priority
being the destruction of the Luftwaffe
fighter force and the fighter production facilities, followed by attacks on
German petroleum and synthetic oil and fuel manufacturing.
A Return to
Germany: Oil and Dresden
Harris ignored much of both directives and continued the night
attacks against German cities. The USAAF, however, concentrated its B-17’s and B-24s against both, the Luftwaffe
and the factories associated with fighter production while simultaneously
striking Germany’s
petroleum facilities. The most significant change from 1943 to the summer of
1944 was that the Allies finally had long-range fighter escorts in the Merlin-engined
P-51 Mustang and the heavy P-47 Thunderbolt. By the end of 1944 and into early
1945, the USAAF was almost exclusively focused on a campaign against German
oil; the synthetic fuel for the air and ground machines of the Wehrmacht. This, the Allies concentrated
on, until the end of the war. In focusing on the petroleum facilities, the
Allied Bombers forced the Luftwaffe
to curtail flight hours and the Wehrmacht to leave many of its armored
vehicles idle in motor pools for lack of fuel. Bomber Command participated in
the anti-petroleum campaign as well, however, Harris adamantly continued the ‘area bombing’ of
Germany. As many cities were razed, Bomber Command updated target lists and
added other cities.
The finals months of the war saw Bomber Command destroy a city which
would have repercussions across the Alliance and the RAF. The 7th
largest city in Germany in 1945 was Dresden. It was a culturally important city
with a rich history. Bomber Command planners treated Dresden as they did
numerous the other cities they had attacked; it would simply be another target.
It was selected because it made the list of ‘industrial centers’
remaining in Germany. It was hardly an industrial city of any value,
nevertheless, it was flattened. The news spread across the RAF, USAAF, London
and Washington. Dresden was reported as a ‘terror attack’ and
nothing more. Its reverberations finally reached Churchill who requested an
immediate ‘review’ of the area bombing campaign. The war was finally winding down.
With peace came a review; research, bombing surveys, and after action reports. The
war’s end saw acclaim for some. And
severe criticism for others. Harris, RAF Bomber Command, and the area bombing
campaign came in for review.
Criticisms: Area
Bombing and Precision Bombing
Criticisms of the bombing offensive have included the acknowledged
argument that ‘precision’ was hardly ever achieved. Further critiques identified the bombing
offensive invariably included horrible civilian casualties, and most alarmingly,
that German industrial efforts actually increased every six months thereafter.
Although the criticisms are certainly warranted, the period between 1942 and
the ‘Normandy’ landings in June 1944, the Allied bombing offensive did in fact
yield significant effects on the German war making capacity in the East and
across Europe overall. The ‘Luftwaffe,’ who
bore the brunt of the Allied aerial offensive, had to dramatically shift
resources from southern Europe and especially on the Eastern Front, in order to
defend the homeland. German men and women were dedicated to manning defensives
across industrial centers. Over a million personnel manned over 35,000
anti-aircraft batteries. And the campaign wrested control of the skies over
Europe from the Luftwaffe to the
Allies. The Allied aerial campaign and the associated sacrifices made by the
RAF, RCAF, and USAAF prepared the conditions for the Allied pushes into Germany
from the East and West.
Bomber Command and Arthur Harris received much criticism during and
after the war for ‘area
bombing’ typically included the civilian
loss of life on the ground. And much credit, in the moral argument, has been
given to the USAAF and their election to bomb with precision, having avoided
area bombing altogether. The USAAF did participate in area bombing attacks on
occasion with much the same results as Bomber Command. But the distinction ends
rather abruptly when, in the course of the entire Second World War, the USAAF
fire bombed every major Japanese city and industry killing more Japanese
civilians than both the atomic bomb casualty figures from Hiroshima and
Nagasaki combined.
The essential question with respect to the Allied Bombing Offensive
during the Second World War should be related to the concept of ‘total war’
rather than the effects. How did the bomber fit in to the concept of total war?
Douhet had first proposed strategic bombing as a decisive aspect of total war.
He hinted that bombers could ravage a nation from the air while its ground
forces waited on the periphery. This, in order to avoid the carnage that was
the ‘Great War.’ From both Churchill’s and Roosevelt’s
conferences, it is apparent that both wished to avoid the casualty figures of
Verdun and the Somme. The Allied Bombing Offensive provided the ‘space and time’ for
the Allies Armies to sort themselves out for their eventual investment on the
European continent. With regard to the
matter of time, one could only imagine the progress of the war should the
Allied bombing campaign have never been undertaken.
Conclusion
The terminology used between Bomber Command and the USAAF led to
some very sharp differences in their approaches to Douhet’s theories. In the USAAF, advocates of ‘precision bombing’ fully
believed in the Norden bombsight, and subsequently, were also champions of the
strategic effects of airpower. Of the whole effort, Bomber Command bombed
Germany by night as the USAAF by day. This was total war; an effort to destroy
German industrial capacity, communications networks, synthetic fuel, rail
yards, ports, airfields, and factories. And perhaps German morale. The Allied
Bombing Campaign was done with the technology of the day and the technology
didn’t always match up with the
understanding of theory. The Bombing Campaign was indeed an offensive; the
Allied Air Forces owned the initiative and executed a most aggressive and
thorough application of airpower across the full spectrum air operations.
The results of the Combined Bomber Offensive did not inhibit
Germany’s capacity for production of war
making material. German industry was spread out far beyond the Ruhr valley and
didn’t come online (fully mobilized for
war) until well after 1942. Modern industrial capacity was simply not very well
understood by many of the target planners. Bomb damage assessment of the Ruhr
campaign was often overestimated. So too was the claim that the ‘bombers could win the war.’ The Allied Combined Bomber Offensive couldn’t win the war as the
single instrument in the Allies arsenal. German fighter production actually
increased as the Bomber Offensive increased its activities. As such, critics
point out the manufacturing increases by Germany as a measure of the Bomber
Offensives failure. However, any discussion as to the effects of the Bomber
Offensive must return to the original intent of the overall strategy by the
Allies. On balance, Bomber Command and the USAAF accomplished the following:
the “Luftwaffe was fatally weakened;
German transportation was successfully interdicted; the submarine and V-weapons
successfully combated from the air; the German economy increasingly eroded in
the year-long conquest of mainland Europe.”[9]
What decreased were efficiencies in distribution of German
material. Second and third order effects included a forced ‘dispersal’ of
manufacturing, husbanding of certain assets such as fighters for homeland
defense, and logistics/communications issues that hindered effective command
and transport. A most important facet of the Allied Air Offensive was that it
may not have decreased production to the degree anticipated by the various Air
Force planners, but it certainly emplaced limits as to ‘how much could ever be produced.’ Fifteen years after the end of the Second World War, Albert Speer,
the former Reich Minister of Armaments and War Production, from his jail cell
in Spandau Prison wrote:
…The
real importance of the air war consisted in the fact that it opened a second
front long before the invasion of Europe. That front was the skies over Germany…The
unpredictability of the attacks made the front gigantic.[10]
It was these effects that significantly contributed to the Allies
victorious march into Berlin. Regardless of the semantics, British and American
bombers struck Germany. And they repeatedly struck every aspect of the German
society from government buildings, to marshalling yards, ports, factories,
roads, power plants, to cities and residences. In 1939, after the ‘German Blitz’
against London, the world, which had slept through the bombing of Guernica in
1937 was suddenly awake. Soon Birmingham, Belfast, Coventry, Glasgow,
Sheffield, and Swansea would be added. For the remainder of the war, the
British people didn’t
raise too many objections against the area bombing of German cities. A few
raised their voices. RAF aircrew didn’t much care for it either; it was a task that had to be done.
Randall Hansen in his work, Fire and
Fury: The Allied Bombing of Germany 1942-1945, certainly took issue with
the Bomber Offensive. He judges it amoral. And many do. But the Russians, who
surely benefitted from the Allied Bomber Offensive, as it simply tied down more
and more Luftwaffe fighters for home
defense as opposed to the Eastern Front, didn’t judge it amoral. Especially with the loss of 27 million of her
own men, women, and children in the most epic struggle in human history.
Regardless of the moral aspects associated with the Allied strategic bombing of
Germany, the campaign was indeed, tremendously effective.
Bibliography
Bowman, Martin W, Voices in
Flight: Daylight Bombing Operations 1939-1942, Pen and Sword, Barnsley:
2014
Hallion, Richard P, Strike
From the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack 1911-1945, Smithsonian
Institution, Washington D.C.: 1989
Hansen, Randall, Fire and
Fury: The Allied Bombing of Germany 1942-45, Doubleday Canada, 2008
Hastings, Max, Bomber
Command: Churchill’s Epic
Campaign, The Inside Story of the RAF’s Valiant Attempt to End the War,
Touchstone, New York: 1979
Hecks, Karl, Bombing
1939-1945: The Air Offensive Against Land Targets in World War II, Robert
Hale, London: 1990
Murray, Williamson and Millett, Alan R. A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War, The Belknap Press
of Harvard University Press, Cambridge: 2000
Overy, R.J., The Air War: 1939-1945, Stein and Day, Briarcliff Manor: 1980
Overy, Richard, Why The Allies Won, Norton and Company New
York: 1995
Richards, Denis, The Hardest
Victory: RAF Bomber Command in the Second World War, Norton and Company,
New York: 1994
Saundby, Sir Robert, Air Marshal, Air Bombardment: The Story of Its Development, Harper and Brother,
New York: 1961
Weinberg, Gerhard L., A World
At Arms: A Global History of World War II, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge: 1994
Verier, Anthony, The Bomber
Offensive: The Exciting Saga of the American and British Bomber Offensive
against Germany from 1939 to 1945, Macmillan Company, London: 1968
[1]
Saundby, Sir Robert, Air Marshal, Air
Bombardment: The Story of Its Development, Harper and Brother, New York:
1961 p.145
[2] Hecks, Karl, Bombing 1939-1945: The Air Offensive Against Land Targets in World War II, Robert Hale, London: 1990 p.93
[3] Ibid p.81
[4] Hastings, Max, Bomber Command: Churchill’s Epic Campaign, The Inside Story of the
RAF’s Valiant Attempt to End the War, Touchstone, New York: 1979 p. 236
[5] Ibid p.241
[6] Verier, Anthony, The Bomber Offensive: The Exciting Saga of
the American and British Bomber Offensive against Germany from 1939 to 1945,
Macmillan Company, London: 1968 p.321
[8] Ibid p.327
[9]
Overy, R.J.,
The Air War: 1939-1945, Stein and
Day, Briarcliff Manor: 1980 p.152
[10] Hastings, Max, Bomber Command: Churchill’s Epic Campaign,
The Inside Story of the RAF’s Valiant Attempt to End the War, Touchstone,
New York: 1979 p. 241
Comments
Post a Comment