“Blitzkrieg”: The Myth and Reality
“Blitzkrieg”: A Word or Doctrine?
“Blitzkrieg.” The very word conjures up the image of ‘lighting speed;’ combined arms attacks by ‘panzers’ (tanks) and screaming Stuka dive bombers
that leaves Armies in ruins. Doctrinally speaking, the Wehrmacht
(German Armed Forces) had no term employed such as ‘blitzkrieg.’ What they did
have was an operational focus on the offensive, combined with the maturity of
technology by 1939, and initiative pushed down to the lowest level.
The
military balance in 1940 was such that on paper, the French and British
Expeditionary Force (BEF) actually outnumbered the Germans in both armor and
aircraft. So what of the speedy German victory? For the French, “no effective,
functioning, Allied command structure existed in 1939-40.”[1]
In addition, the French and the BEF believed the defense should have
concentration in the Low countries and Holland. The Germans, however, under
Eric von Manstein’s plan, boldly struck out well south of the concentrated
French and British forces, along a southerly axis via the Ardennes. “Shrewd and
daring handling of the concentrated German armored formations, effectively
supported at critical moments by the tactical employment of the German Air
Force, gave the major impetus for victory”.[2]
The
myth of the ‘blitzkrieg’ was a handy literal mechanism developed by the press
and effectively employed by the Western military as the excuse for the collapse
of France and the withdrawal of the British BEF. The truth lay more with the
daring operational plan, the concentration of armor, and the excellent
coordination between German ground and air units. The truth, in armor for
example, was that in “May 1940 the 2,349 tanks of the Wehrmacht faced 4,204
Allied battle tanks.”[3]
All along, the Germans would be outnumbered in just about every definable
metric. Except the most important; the refined and offensive doctrine executed
by a well-trained and professional force who clearly understood combined arms
operations.
The results of von Schlieffen’s
work presented speed, surprise, and manoeuvre as the key ingredients for a
quick, sharp war. At all costs was a protracted conflict to be avoided. World
War I would deny the Germans of victory and Schlieffen’s plan never came to be.
World War I, however,
prevented Schlieffen’s strategy to be fully realized as technology, then in its
infancy (eg motorized vehicles, communications sets) prevented mobility from
fully supporting. Large troop formations could be transported by train but this
hardly translated to the operational let alone the tactical.
Post-World War I, saw the
German Army, although inhibited by the Treaty of Versailles, recalibrate her
armed forces and incorporate lessons learned during the Great War. What soon
developed, was the incorporation of the emerging technology that would allow
the German Army to fully exploit the tenets of manoeuvre warfare; radio
equipped tanks, close air-ground cooperation, and the idea of ‘Aufragstaktik’, or ‘mission orders.’
German operations
typically concentrated forces, or mass, at the decisive point; the ‘schwerpunkt’. The decisive point being
the center of gravity operationally, was also atypically where the enemy was
weakest or along the flanks. As such, armor, as in tanks, was concentrated for
breakthroughs and exploitation. In the attack, all armored formations received
the full weight of the supporting ‘Luftflotte’,
or Air Force air groups to deny the enemy any ability to either reinforce or
counter attack.
The first real development
of armored tactics were proposed not by the Germans but by the British! Major
General J.F.C. Fuller and later, Sir Basil Liddell Hart, both exposed upon the
ideas of ‘infiltration’, manoeuvre, and “the means proposed were a sudden
eruption of squadrons of fast moving tanks.”[5]
But what of the European
Armies on the eve of World War I? Analysis reveals several issues from the
political, to the operational, and ultimately to the tactics employed and the
quality of the equipment used. The British would hardly employ near enough forces
on the continent in 1939. And as for the French, they exercised poor
generalship coupled by the doctrine of utilizing armor in support of infantry.
The extreme opposite of the German armored formations they would face. Further,
both the British and French had politically settled on a ‘defensive’ approach
to the problems posed by Germany. The Maginot Line had at least allowed the
French to husband forces further afield but, the Germans had penetrated in
areas weakly defended or least expected.
General Heinz Guderian is
often thought of as the ‘father’ of the mature German Panzer formations that
crashed in to Poland in 1939 and again through the Ardennes on in to France in
1940. Guderian had essentially built the Panzer arm and had fully comprehended
the writings of Hart and Fuller. Guderian placed radios in ALL tanks for
starters. In addition, he developed and matured the tactics that would deliver
the operational breakthrough and penetration that higher command of the
Wehrmacht desired.
Lastly, the German
approach at the tactical (Platoon, Company, Battalion) level was markedly
different and ultimately superior to all the other European formations
combined. The ‘Truppenfuhrung’ was
the fundamental field manual of the German Army published in 1933. It was the
base document for unit level operations, joint operations, and service manual.
This manual was indeed superior to anything the British or French had and was
an “effective and realistic doctrine of employing combined arms maneuver
warfare.”[6]
Economy of force
operations, utilizing combined arms formations with massed armor and close air
support, saw the German Army at its offensive best in 1939 and 1940. Striking
at weak flanks, with a highly effective troop level doctrine, delivered the
German Army a series of rapid and unbelievable successes and proved no match
for the British and French Armies who were compromised from the start of the
conflict with poor operational plans, dilution of combat power (specifically in
the way they handled armor) and a political disposition that all but prevented
any solid and cohesive defense.
[1] Weinberg, Gerhard, A World At Arms A global History of World War II, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge: 1994 p. 127.
[2] Ibid. p.127.
[3] Freiser, Karl-Heinz, The Blitzkrieg Legend The 1940 Campaign in the West, Naval
Institute Press, Annapolis: 2005 p.38.
[4] Foley, Robert T., “Blitzkrieg”, BBC History, London: March 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/blitzkrieg_01.shtml accessed on 1 October, 2018.
[5] Cooper, Matthew, The German Army 1939-1945, Scarborough House, London:1978 p.142.
[6] Condell, Bruce and Zabecki, David T, On the German Art of War Truppenfurung, Stackpole Books, 2009 p. X
Comments
Post a Comment