Historical Debate: On Spruance and Halsey and the Great Debates
Historical
Debate: On Spruance and Halsey and the Great Debates
INTRODUCTION
The war in the Pacific during World War II contained many
personalities to match the vastness of the theater. Names like MacArthur,
Nimitz, LeMay and minor characters like Puller, Boyington, and Bong fill the
annals of the great battles on tropical islands, the green-blue seas, and the
big skies above the unending Pacific Ocean. Of the characters and personalities
that led the many battles across those islands and seas, two Admirals and their
actions have remained constant points of debate in the matter of U.S. Naval
history of the Pacific in World War II. Admiral Raymond Spruance is the center
of debate for actions during the Battle of the Philippine Sea (June 19–20, 1944) and Admiral William Halsey for his
actions during the Battle of the Leyte Gulf (23–26 October 1944).
ADMIRAL SPRUANCE
By
all accounts, Admiral Spruance has been identified as one of the most steady,
cool, and intelligent combat commanders in the Pacific. Spruance has been
called “the best tactician and perhaps the best mind of the U.S. Navy.”[1] He was and remains a
fascinating study in character and leadership. He was aloof, took his meals
alone, asked hundreds of questions of his subordinates and was exceedingly
bright; of a quick sharp mind.
Spruance
was also a ‘black shoe,’ ie a surface warfare officer of the line, and of cruisers
and battleships. As such, he was not a ‘brown shoe,’ ie a Naval Aviator.
Interestingly, he was viewed as fully capable and had replaced Admiral William
‘Bull’ Halsey (suffering from an illness and hospitalized at Pearl Harbor) just
prior to the Battle of Midway. Spruance’s accomplishments in that terribly
important battle, sealed his fate and fortune. He was hesitatingly accepted as
a ‘carrier admiral’ thereafter.
The
heart of the Spruance-Philippine Sea debate stems from his actions during the
Battle of the Philippine Sea compared against his hard won victory at the
Battle of Midway. After Midway, Americans had come to expect aggressive action,
decisive victories, and a quick end to the war. Adding to the debate and in sharp contrast,
are the opposite personalities between Spruance and Halsey. No two Admirals
could be more different in intellect, conduct, and manner.
The
U.S. Navy had a complicated scheme whereby Admirals Halsey and Spruance
essentially commanded the same Fleet! Admiral Nimitz “devised a scheme of
command whereby Spruance and Halsey would alternate as task force commanders.”[2] When the Fleet was under
Halsey, it was called the ‘3rd Fleet’ and under Spruance, the ‘5th
Fleet’. The staffs would essentially remain the same with perhaps changes in
personal aides. The vessels, crewmen, air wings and aircraft would all remain
the same. This obviously created a contrast in operational procedures,
leadership styles, and general disposition of the Fleet owing to the
personality differences between Spruance and Halsey. That Spruance had been
successful and associated with the sinking of four IJN carriers during the
Battle of Midway came as no surprise to those who knew him; superiors and
subordinates alike. But, in sharp contrast to Halsey, Spruance was not keen on
impulsive action or overly aggressive handling of his fleet. Spruance’s
“impressive cerebral capabilities were manifested not in philosophical terms
but by the ability to evaluate each tactical situation without emotion, to
calculate probable outcomes using available data, and to select a course of
action based upon military considerations tempered by a healthy respect for his
opponent.”[3]
THE BATTLE OF THE
PHILIPPINE SEA
The
Battle of the Philippine Sea marked a turning point for the U.S. Navy in the
conquest east towards the Japanese home islands of the Pacific campaign during
World War II. The aftermath was the decimation of Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN)
air arm. The “Great Marianas Turkey Shoot” saw the destruction of 430+ IJN
aircraft of 450 or so committed against the 5th U.S. Fleet. The
aerial battle that followed saw the U.S. Navy fighter pilots, flying the
Grumman F-6 Hellcats, have a field day, when they engaged the IJN aircraft.
Legends like Commander David McCampbell and Lieutenant Alex Vraciu, both became
‘aces in a day’, having shot down five or more Japanese aircraft during those
chaotic aerial battles.
MAP#1: Overall Area of Operations during actions of 18-19 June 1944.[4]
The
actions of 16-18 June 1944 were due to the U.S. Navy amphibious assaults on
Saipan and Tinian. In conjunction, an assault was to also take place to seize
the island of Guam. From the strategic
or theater level, these amphibious assaults were all associated with the island
hopping campaign across the central Pacific.
The
IJN had avoided a decisive battle with the ever growing and powerful U.S. Navy.
The Battle of Midway was a significant loss to the IJN and they husbanded their
carriers and accompanying air wings for a decisive action. The amphibious
operations along the Marianas that June, afforded the IJN their opportunity to
strike.
The
resulting action that followed were based on Spruance’s decision to keep his
carrier task forces close to Saipan rather than meeting the IJN surface fleet
that assembled in the Philippine Sea. The carrier Task Force commander
(Mitscher) and his subordinate carrier skippers and air wings desired a
westward meeting engagement with the IJN for a decisive battle. Further, the
carrier Task Force (Task Force 58 (TF 58)) had almost 1,000 aircraft with an
incredible array of modern battleships and cruisers in the van.
But
Spruance, ever calculating, ordered his TF 58 commander, Admiral Marc Mitscher,
to sally westward during the day and eastward, towards Saipan proper, during
the night. Spruance “stuck firmly to the view that his main task was to cover
the invasion force on Saipan no matter what happened.”[5]
In
the end, Spruance’s forces were arrayed to conduct near simultaneous amphibious
operations spread out from Saipan to Tinian and Guam. Spruance had to also
defend his amphibious forces, provide close air support to the U.S. Marine and
Army Divisions ashore all while preparing for a certain IJN strike. Spruance,
mindful of Guadalcanal and Midway, prioritized the defense of his amphibious
fleet above destruction of any striking IJN fleet.
The
clash that followed, saw the decisive destruction of IJN aircraft that rendered
the IJN Combined Fleet and her carriers all but useless. Nevertheless, critics
of Spruance were harsh, and with the benefit of hindsight, were all completely
focused on striking and decisively engaging the IJN fleet. This view ignores
the order to provide protection for the amphibious operations across the
Marianas. Those that defended Spruance, to include none other than Admiral
Nimitz himself said of Spruance’s actions during the Battle of the Philippine
Sea: “The constant was that every time Admiral Raymond A. Spruance commanded an
operation against the Japanese, they lost.”[6] Two camps subsequently
emerged; those that believe Spruance was over cautious and those that supported
Spruance’s decision to remain close to Saipan in order to protect and defend
the amphibious operations
ADMIRAL HALSEY
The 3rd Fleet
Commander, Admiral William ‘Bull’ Halsey, was a decorated World War I (Navy
Cross) destroyer officer and at the age of 52, he qualified as a Naval Aviator.
Halsey was not necessarily “an intellectual luminary, but he knew instinctively
where the future of naval power lay.”[7] He was colorful,
aggressive, and had a knack for selecting the best and brightest subordinates
to surround himself with on his staffs. He was tremendously loved by his
sailors and “the aircrews and lower deck would do anything for him and probably
gave him more than they gave any commander.”[8] He loved attention and was
at ease with the media. And he delivered more during these interviews, than
hoped for, and his commentary, however colorful, did much to raise the morale
of sailors and civilians alike. Halsey, was the extroverted polar opposite of
the media shy and aloof Spruance.
THE BATTLE OF LEYTE GULF
The Battle of Leyte Gulf was the largest naval battle of
World War II and was the culminating efforts across the Marianas campaign. The stage
was finally set for action across the Philippine islands and General Douglas
MacArthur’s return to those islands. Halsey would have his 3rd Fleet
attached to the 7th Fleet. Nimitz’ orders to Halsey and his ‘Task
Force 38’ (remainder of the 3rd Fleet organized for the invasion of
the Philippines) was essentially this: “cover and support forces of Southwest
Pacific in order to assist the seizure and occupation of objectives in the
Central Philippines, and destroy enemy naval and air forces in or threatening
the Philippines Area.”[9]
The task was pretty clear. However, as James Cutler
points out in his book, The Battle of
Leyte Gulf, Nimitz provided a proviso that, with the fresh lessons of
Spruance’s cautious actions (protecting the Saipan invasion force) in the
Philippine Sea, gave Halsey a free hand: “In case of opportunity for
destruction of major portion of the enemy fleet offers or can be created, such
destruction becomes the primary task.”[10]
It was this caveat that set the conditions for Halsey’s
actions in the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Unknown to Nimitz and Halsey, the IJN
staff had done their homework. Their entire plan in and around the Philippines
was predicated on the anticipated ‘aggressive actions’ of Halsey. If the IJN
striking forces could lure Halsey away from the main U.S. Fleet, a doorway or
opening could be made for yet another IJN striking force to attack.
As the battle unfolded several things came to light:
Halsey never spoke or communicated clearly with Nimitz thousands and thousands
of miles away in Pearl Harbor. Further, Halsey did indeed fall for the decoy
force the IJN had established. As such, Halsey left the San Bernadino Strait
completely unguarded and worse, Halsey’s communication issues constantly misled
both Admirals Kinkaid and Nimitz as to either his disposition or intent.
Halsey took his force north to engage the IJN Northern
strike force and eventually, Kinkaid, realizing that the San Bernadino strait
was unguarded, rushed destroyers and destroyer escorts up to close with yet
another IJN striking force (South). Again, more legends were born that day as
the little jeep carriers fought with their sole 5 inch guns with their little
‘tin can’ escorting destroyers attacking the approaching IJN heavy cruisers. Lieutenant Commander Evans of
the Johnston (DD: Destroyer) and
Lieutenant Commander Copeland of the Samuel
B Roberts (DE: Destroyer Escort) fought like lions against overwhelming
odds in the associated Battle of Samar.
THE DEBATE CONTINUES
The
point of friction, still debated to this day, boils down to Halsey’s decision
to take his forces north and thus, leave the San Bernadino strait unguarded.
Several factors come into play when attempting to determine Halsey’s decision
points: one, The IJN Northern strike force up north of the San Bernadino had struck a terrible blow the day before, sinking
the carrier Princeton. Further, in
Halsey’s own words: “It is a cardinal
principle of naval warfare not to divide one’s force to such an extent as will
permit it to be beaten in detail.”[11]
It is that point
which many take issue with because Halsey, carrying his flag on a battleship,
could have left his battleships at the San Bernadino strait with some detached
light carriers to provide air cover, and pursued the IJN Northern Strike force
with his heavy carriers and their escorts. That he elected not to divide his very powerful force and proceeded
north, all the while painting a very hazy picture for both Kinkaid and Nimitz,
set the conditions for small destroyers, destroyer escorts and ‘jeep carriers’
(Light Carriers) to rush north and engage the heavy and light cruisers and
battleships of the IJN Southern striking force.
The Leyte Gulf aftermath saw the blame cast at Halsey for
abandoning the San Bernadino strait as well as others for not obtaining clearer
pictures from Halsey in order to determine true intentions and dispositions. In
addition, the command arrangement between Pearl Harbor to the Philippines, did
little to assist the commanders and combatants in their decision making.
MAP#2:
The Battle of Leyte Gulf: Fleet Movement.[12]
The
irony of Admiral Halsey’s actions are that one, he fell for the ruse and was lured
by the IJN during the Battle of Leyte Gulf. The IJN had also attempted a lure during
the Battle of Midway (4–7 June 1942).
And second, Admiral Spruance avoided this very trap during the Battle of the
Philippine Sea. Spruance had been at
Midway in Halsey’s stead. Spruance, from his handling of the 5th
Fleet during the Battle of the Philippine Sea was pilloried for perceived
‘inaction’ and cautiousness. Halsey, avoided all caution and aggressively
pursued the perceived threat at the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Yet Halsey,
afterwards, had been criticized for his actions.
Strategically, it appears that Spruance
understood the center of gravity in the Pacific campaign, by 1944, and had
shifted from concentrating on IJN carriers (ie. ‘the mobile airfields’) to the
actual aircraft themselves! Spruance had cleared his aircraft carriers of
torpedo and bombing aircraft (kept below decks) favoring fighter aircraft for
the defense of the 5th Fleet. And the ultimate destruction of the
IJN aircraft that soon followed during the Battle of the Philippine Sea.
Halsey, however, appeared to take the IJN bait in the
Leyte Gulf and sallied north to engage IJN ‘flattops.’ He was still focused on
the aircraft carriers, not the aircraft themselves. In fairness, Halsey could
hardly be blamed for lacking clarity as to the ‘Commanders Intent,’ ie Nimitz’s
somewhat cryptic caveat; ‘opportunity for
destruction of major portion of the enemy fleet’ and ‘destruction becomes the primary task.’
Spruance had indeed approached the Saipan landings and
the emerging threat to his West with caution. Many subordinate commanders were
left with bitterness after the Battle of the Philippine Sea. Mitscher,
Spruance’s carrier commander, provided an after action report that simply said
“the enemy had escaped.”[13] Perhaps the ‘Guadalcanal
campaign’ had made an impression on Spruance. But as the ghosts of Guadalcanal
toyed with Spruance, so too did the ‘ghosts’ of the Philippine Sea apparently
play with Halsey.
Both Admirals Halsey and Spruance forever carried the
self-doubt and introspective second guessing of their actions during the
Battles of the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf. And perhaps the self-doubt was
far worse a thing than any debate and critique from peers and historians in the
many years afterwards. With the benefit of hindsight, not withstanding,
Spruance was wise to remain protective of the amphibious operations across the
Marianas and Halsey? Halsey should have protected the San Bernadino Straits
while, simultaneously meeting the IJN Northern striking force. Perhaps he could
have set a trap of his own. Either way, both men delivered remarkable outcomes
on the balance of their respective careers. And despite the criticisms of their
actions the Battles of the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf were, ultimately,
lopsided victories for the United States Navy, her hard fighting sailors and
aviators, and for those tremendous Admirals; Admirals Spruance and Halsey.
Bibliography
Cutler, Thomas J.,
The Battle of Leyte Gulf, 23-26 October
1944, Harper-Collins Publishers, New York, 1994, p12
Hornfischer, James
D., The Fleet at Floodtide, America at
Total War in The Pacific, 1944-1945, Bantam Books, New York, 2016, p.102
Hughes,
W.P., “Clear Purpose, Comprehensive Execution--Raymond Ames Spruance,” Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive DSpace
Repository, Faculty and Researchers Collection, United States Naval Post
Graduate School, Monterey, 2010
Spector,
Ronald H., The Eagle Against The Sun, The American War with Japan, The Free
Press, Macmillan, New York, 1985, p.312
Van der Vat, Dan, The Pacific Campaign, The U.S.-Japanese
Naval War 1941-1945, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1991, p.151
MAPS
MAP#1: Lyons,
Chuck, “The Last Great Carrier Clash: The Battle of the
Philippine Sea,” Warfare History Network, 2 November, 2015, http://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/wwii/the-last-great-carrier-clash-the-battle-of-the-philippine-sea/ accessed on 22 June 2018
MAP#2: United
States Navy: Public Affairs, USS Leyte Gulf, Map, Battle of Leyte Gulf, http://www.public.navy.mil/surflant/cg55/Pages/Battle.aspx accessed on 22
June 2018
[1] Van der Vat, Dan, The Pacific Campaign, The U.S.-Japanese
Naval War 1941-1945, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1991, p.182
[2] Hornfischer, James D., The Fleet at Floodtide, America at Total War
in The Pacific, 1944-1945, Bantam Books, New York, 2016, p.102
[3] Cutler, Thomas J., The Battle of Leyte Gulf, 23-26 October 1944,
Harper-Collins Publishers, New York, 1994, p12
[4] Lyons, Chuck, “The
Last Great Carrier Clash: The Battle of the Philippine Sea,” Warfare History
Network, 2 November, 2015, http://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/wwii/the-last-great-carrier-clash-the-battle-of-the-philippine-sea/
accessed on 22 June 2018
[5] Van der Vat, Dan, The Pacific Campaign, The U.S.-Japanese
Naval War 1941-1945, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1991, p.332
[6] Hughes,
W.P., “Clear Purpose,
Comprehensive Execution--Raymond Ames Spruance,” Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive DSpace
Repository, Faculty and Researchers Collection, United States Naval Post
Graduate School, Monterey, 2010
[7] Van der Vat, Dan, The Pacific Campaign, The U.S.-Japanese
Naval War 1941-1945, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1991, p.151
[8] Ibid. p.151
[9] Cutler, Thomas J., The Battle of Leyte Gulf, 23-26 October 1944,
Harper-Collins Publishers, New York, 1994, p59
[10] Ibid, p.60
[11] Ibid. p.293
[12] United States Navy: Public Affairs,
USS Leyte Gulf, Map, Battle of Leyte Gulf, http://www.public.navy.mil/surflant/cg55/Pages/Battle.aspx accessed on 22 June 2018
[13] Spector, Ronald H., The Eagle
Against The Sun, The American War with Japan, The Free Press, Macmillan, New
York, 1985, p.312
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