The Fruit of Victory: Born out of the Ashes of Vietnam

 

The Fruit of Victory: Born out of the Ashes of Vietnam


                        "First Boots on the Ground"[1]

The fruit of the victory of U.S. Armed forces, along with a very broad coalition of allies, in the Gulf War (‘Operation Desert Storm’ 1990-1991) was born out of the ashes of the Vietnam War. A tremendous number of lessons were learned during the Vietnam War. The Platoon, Company and Battalion level officers and fighter and strike pilots of the Vietnam War would shape the training, procurement of equipment and modernization of the U.S.  Armed Forces of the ‘80’s that provided the incredible victory against Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi military in Kuwait.

Doctrinally, the U.S. Armed Forces, freed from the ineffective ‘counterinsurgency’ of Vietnam, retooled and refocused on a combined arms strategy to face the Soviet threat in Eastern Europe. Technological advances exploded in the ‘80’s with precision guided munitions, Global Positioning Satellites (GPS) and even early stealth technology.

The U.S. Army explored the concepts and integration of these new technologies and weapons systems at the Ft Irwin National Training Center. There, they integrated the new M1 Abrams main battle tanks, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and the AH-64 Apache Attack helicopter. In addition, the U.S. Air Force integrated the A-10 Warthog attack aircraft providing Close Air Support (CAS) to the highly mobile Army forces in the desert of Southern California.

“Rock Drill” CMTC, Hohenfels, Germany.[2]

 The All-Volunteer force took shape   and had immediate effect; a   disciplined force, technologically   savvy, and the repetition of the   training cycle would pay dividends   during the Gulf War.

 The strategy and operational   concept employed during   Operation Desert Storm utilized   and leveraged all available assets   from the National Command   Authority and the ‘warfighting   CINC’, Central Command.

 “With their memories of the   terrible frustration of the Vietnam   war, the air offensive planners   envisioned a bold strike, of   intensity dictated only by the plans, the weather, the air forces capability, and the enemy, not by the media or political irresolution.”[3]

The ‘Airland Battle’ doctrine of the 1980’s U.S. Army would be fully implemented during ‘Desert Storm.’ A massive aerial campaign would destroy the Iraqi Air Force and thus, ensure absolute dominance of the air above all U.S. and coalition forces. The U.S. Navy would dominate the Persian Gulf and use the U.S. Marines as an Eastern feint.

Maximum application of force would sever the Command-and-Control capability of the Iraqi’s, deception would serve to get the Iraqi’s off balance, and the ability of the U.S. Army to fight at night with advances in technology would ultimately disrupt the Iraqi ‘OODA’ (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) cycle.

U.S. forces exploited the strategic mobility of the helicopter to plunge deep into the enemy's rear, severing the line of retreat.”[4] The ‘Airland Battle’ doctrine incorporated flexibility, rapid and fluid maneuver coupled with mutually supporting attacks utilizing technologies that provided commanders incredible situational awareness and understanding. “The U.S. doctrine stresses rapid movement on a fluid battlefield, seeking out an opponent's weaknesses while maintaining a high operational tempo to dislocate the enemy force physically and shatter its commanders psychologically.”[5]

By the end of the air and ground campaign, U.S. logisticians had moved well over 500,000 personnel into the theater. Cold War diplomacy and cooperation was, by 1990, very fine tuned and the majority of coalition partners were well trained NATO forces.

                    “Armor on the Hunt”[6]


RESOURCES

[1] William S. Phillips, "First Boots on the Ground," Oil on Canvas, Image size: 28" wide x 14" height, http://www.military-art.co.uk/military-artists/william-s-phillips.asp.

[2] Master Sergeant Sieger Hartgers, U.S. Army Center for Military History, Combat Artist Program, oil on canvas, 30” X 40”, https://history.army.mil/museums/armyArtists/msgHartgers-msgVarisano.html

[3] Grant, Gregory M., “Learning the Correct Lessons from the Gulf War: Strategy: The U.S. military used tactics that worked for Napoleon and for the Germans in World War II. But how will this victory affect the peace?” The Los Angeles Times, 3 March 1991, http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03-03/opinion/op-312_1_world-war/2 accessed on 27 April 2018

[4] Ibid.

[5] Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense (New York: The Free Press, 1984), 637

[6] SFC Darrold Peters, "Armor on the Hunt" - Karbala, Iraq - 2006 Digital Oils, Corel Painter IX.5, U.S. Army Center for Military History, https://history.army.mil/museums/armyArtists/sfcPeters.html

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