The Strategic Allied Bombing Campaign Against Germany: An Assessment
A post-war interview with Albert
Speer, the Reichminister for Armaments and War Production was asked “which, at
various periods of the war, caused most concern; British or American heavy
bomber attacks, day or night attack; and why? Speer replied:
“The American attacks which followed a definite system assault on industrial targets, were by far the most dangerous. It was in fact these attacks which caused the breakdown of the German armaments industry.”[1]
The Allied bombing effort against Germany during the Second World War included the first wholesale use of massed heavy bomber attacks against targets of industry, infrastructure, and against the common civilian. Approaches included both ‘area bombing’ via the Royal Air Force (RAF) and ‘precision bombing’ via the United States Army Air Force (USAAF). The entire effort comprised the Allied ‘strategic bombing’ campaign waged against Germany from 1942-1945.
The RAFs ‘Bomber Command’ started the war on the continent with the intention of conducting medium altitude, precision daylight attacks German industry. Owing to an incredible loss rate the RAF shifted to night attacks and eventually, ‘area bombing’ techniques that targeted cities. And the German cities may or may have not possessed any real industry of import.
The RAF in 1939 possessed no real capability with respect to a bomber force able to precisely target German industry. Early bombers were more often twin engine and lacked range or defensive measures. In addition, the bomb aiming technology of the day could only do so much. Deep penetration raids into German came with a price; a loss rate that would eventually make the Bomber Command combat ineffective.
Post-World War II historiography
demonstrates that there was indeed a tremendous difference between the RAF and
USAAFs approaches to the strategic bombing campaign. While the USAAF tried hard
to pursue ‘precision bombing’ of German military and industrial targets, using
their ‘Norden’ bombsight, the RAF, for several reasons, adopted the ‘area
bombing’ techniques as its mainstay. “Over the course of the war, the RAF
dropped 48 percent of its bombs on town; the Eight Air Force (USAAF) dropped
between 6 and 13 percent.”[2]
The development of the theory and techniques employed by the Allied Air Forces during the Second World War started during World War I and were experimented with in isolated conflicts in Spain (1936), China (1937) and East Africa (1938). The theories espoused settled essentially on three main uses of air power; “Close air support for ground forces, Interdiction at longer ranges to isolate the battlefield from reinforcement, and Strategic long range heavy bombing of the enemy’s heartland”[3] to include both industry and the civil populace.
Much was done during the war with respect to refining the strategic bombing campaign of the Allies. Early radar, beam homing, skip bombing, and pathfinder (target marking) were all developed and implemented. Most importantly, all concepts and theories were put to the test.
Would Douhet’s theory of bombing the civil populace cause chaos and sow terror; even collapse of societies? Or would Mitchell’s and Spaatz’ concepts prevail? Surely the RAF felt pressure to deliver some kind of blow against the Germans for they had bombed London and Coventry during the ‘blitz.’ And the Generals leading the USAAF could have possibly been motivated to gain their independence from the U.S. Army. Much was on the line and many bold predictions were made to include ‘winning the war and defeating NAZI Germany with airpower alone!’
Of all the accompanying acrimony to strategic bombing and chances for victory Henry Tizard laid all arguments to rest. “Tizard said after the war: No one thinks now that it would have been possible to defeat Germany by bombing alone.”[4] There can be no doubt, that the bombers alone could have delivered victory. Even with the advances in technology by 1945, precision was still measured in miles.
But the Allied air offensive did deliver results. “The two great achievements of the Allied strategic air offensive must be conceded to the Americans: the defeat of the Luftwaffe by the Mustang escort-fighter, and the inception of the deadly oil offensive.”[5] And the USAAF and RAF bomber crews were of tremendous and significant assistance in the breakout across Normandy in June 1944.
Of Bomber Command, in 1939, “it
was expected to achieve what British armies, supported by a reluctant America
and a tottering France, had achieved in 1918.”[6] And
during the period of early 1941 to early 1943, the Bomber Command stood alone.
Lacking the technology, escort fighters, and technology required of precision
bombing, they carried the fight across Germany with tremendous losses. Almost
43,000 boys perished in the aerial assault above Germany in those dark days.
As for the Strategic Bombing Survey, the questions posed and the expected quantitative assessments were flawed. In 1941 the Wehrmacht anticipated rapid conquest of the East whilst simultaneously shoring up the conquered West. As such, German industry had hardly been mobilized for a long war of attrition. As 1941 gave way to 1942, things in the East placed significant demands on German industry in order to keep up with war in Russia.
Albert Speer was under intense pressure to squeeze more and more out of German industrial capacity. The Bombing survey assumed that Germany was already mobilized and operating at full capacity in 1941. The expectation was that the Allied Strategic bombing campaign, as it executed a slow start in 1942, would ramp up and subsequently the trend lines for German industrial capacity would tilt in the negative. This wasn’t the case at all and many historians have capitalized on this as an example that the bombing campaign was more a failure than a success.
In fact, the strategic bombing
campaign did produce results. However nuanced, the Germans were firstly, forced
on to the defensive by 1943 and secondly, forced to prioritize its production
programs. “It has been alleged that the American daylight bombing, which was
largely directed at German aircraft and engine industry, was a failure because
German production of fighters was higher at the beginning of 1944 than it had
been a year earlier.”[7] Luftwaffe
fighter aircraft were the number one priority for the defense of the German
homeland against the Allied bombers. Note, fighters and not bombers or U-boats
or other ‘offensive’ material.
Independently taken, I can see the absolutist’s argument against ‘total war’ and bombing civilians. I’m certain that the bomber crews of the RAF and USAAF had no idea that the Germans were busy down below ‘liquidating’ 6 million Jews. That knowledge would come after the war. But in the collective, the entirety of the whole picture, the Allied strategic bombing campaign tied down hundreds of thousands of Germans to the defense of their homeland, wrought destruction to both city and factory alike, applied a consistent pressure to the Wehrmact and Oberkommando West; so much so that the Germans were unable to regain the offensive or replenish their war making material in order to gain an advantage over the Allies.
However immoral aerial bombing of populated centers was and is, the German people remained stoic, as did the Londoners, in the onslaught of aerial bombing. Douhet wasn’t correct after all. But Spaatz and Mitchell were.
RESOURCES
[1] Hastings, Max, Bomber Command, (New York: Touchstone Simon and Schuster, 1979), 349.
[2] Ibid, 350.
[3] Hecks, Karl, Bombing 1939-1945 The Air Offensive against Land Targets in World War II, (London: Robert Hale, 1990), 22.
[4]
Ibid, 273.
[5] Verrier, Anthony, The Bomber Offensive, (London: Macmillan, 1968), 14.
[6] Saundby, Robert, Air Bombardment The Story of its Development, (New York: Harper and Brother, 1961), 213.
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