The Russian Way of War: Despite Technology and Capability, Firepower is the Russian God of War

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The Russian Way of War: Despite Technology and Capability, Firepower is the Russian God of War


Current combat operations in Eastern Ukraine see’s the Russian Army massing around three major urban zones; Kiev, Kharkov, and Irpin. It is obvious that the Russians underestimated Ukrainian resistance but upon closer scrutiny, the Russians respected the effects of climate; “Rasputitsa” (распу́тица) the muddy season as much of their effort has been road-bound.

Despite the poor showing, it looks as if the Russian General Staff elected to utilize up to four military districts[1] to provide Command and Control (C2) for the Ukraine “special military operation.” With the initial timeline and plan thrown aside, Moscow is certain to press the Russian Armed Forces to employ all available assets and concentrate them against specific objectives.

The available assets will certainly include strategic aircraft (bombers) but most likely will include long range fires from Ballistic missiles to multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) and all available artillery. Artillery will consist of the venerable 130mm to 152mm.

The Russian Army ‘Battalion Tactical Group’ (BTG) is more like a U.S. Marine “Marine Expeditionary Unit” (MEU) than any Western NATO or U.S. Army Battalion. A major difference is artillery; A Battery (4-6 105mm or 155mm like the M777) may be assigned to a USMC MEU. Typically, within U.S. Army Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs), 1x single Artillery Battalion is assigned with three firing batteries in General and Direct support to the Infantry Battalions within the Brigade.

The Russian Army “had the entire brigade’s support and enabling resources, but it had only one mechanized-infantry battalion, often supplemented by a tank company and additional rocket artillery.”[2] The major difference between the USMC MEU and the Russian BTG, for example, is assigned artillery batteries. The Russians assign up to 2 or 3 batteries along with MLRS (127mm).

The Russians currently have over 2000 Self Propelled systems along with over 1,400 towed artillery guns and 1,100 MLRS. With over 4,500 tubes available, the Russians will undoubtedly employ a great many in Ukraine.

Writing for the U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), Mr. Lester Grau and Dr. Jacob W. Kipp wrote “Urban Combat: Confronting the Spector” in 1999. In they observe:

“One recent approach suggests that the commander can use urban penetration tactics to move on multiple axes to seize an important objective and then isolate and protect it from the enemy.13 This was the initial approach by Russian forces in the battle for Grozny. They moved on multiple axes to seize the presidential palace, railroad station and radio/television center. They moved unopposed until they were deep in the city, where they attacked and destroyed. The Chechen opposition learned not to provide any permanent strong points that would provide a focus for Russian air, artillery and maneuver forces.14 Rather, the Chechens employed temporary strong- points and a great deal of internal mobility to deploy and redeploy strong points throughout the city. The Russians learned that they had to secure lines of communication to the captured deep objective or the occupying force would quickly be cut off.”[3]


Downtown Gronzy, Chechnya. 2000

 

The Russians did not simply arrive at massing artillery against urban structures in Chechnya. Nor in Aleppo, Syria.



The Russians learned how to raze whole cities and urban structures during the Second World War, or, the “Great Patriotic War” as the Russians call it. Between 1941 and 1945 the Russians employed indirect rockets, howitzers, and mortars that are reportedly responsible for the over 80% of the destruction of German units in zone.

 

During the Battle of Stalingrad, Russian Artillery would both, stop the German offensive and deny the German breakout of that city. “The German attack was disrupted by a heavy artillery and Katyusha rocket barrage laid by the Soviet batteries situated on the east bank of the Volga” and “the batteries fired on average, 10,000 rounds a day.”[1]

 

Stalingrad saw a remarkable amount of artillery employed against the encircled German 6th Army.  By the summer of 1943, at Kursk, the Red Army would employ over 21,000 artillery guns against the German pincers (North and South of the bulge). Of the 21,000 artillery guns, almost “20 were employed for each mile”[2] of frontage and it would eventually grow to over 100 artillery guns and mortars per mile!

 

The Red Army would rely on its artillery for the remainder of the war. While the Soviets increased their inventory of main battle tanks during the 1950s to the 1990s, their reliance on artillery would persist. The Russian way of war appears to be simple; the maximum application and concentration of firepower at the decisive point as evidenced in Stalingrad, Grozny, Aleppo, and possibly Kiev.



[1] Tarrant, V. E., Stalingrad : Anatomy of an Agony, (Havertown: Pen & Sword Books Limited, 1992), Accessed March 9, 2022. ProQuest Ebook Central.

[2] Seidler, Hans. Battle of Kursk, 1943. (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books Limited, 2011). Accessed March 9, 2022. ProQuest Ebook Central.

 

 


[1] Tim Ripley, “Ukraine conflict: Russian military adapts command-and-control for Ukraine operations,” Janes, News: Ukraine Conflict,  https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/ukraine-conflict-russian-military-adapts-command-and-control-for-ukraine-operations

[2] CPT Nicolas J. Fiore, “Defeating the Russian Battalion Tactical Group,” Armor Magazine, Spring 2017, Ft Benning, GA, https://www.benning.army.mil/armor/eARMOR/content/issues/2017/Spring/2Fiore17.pdf#:~:text=The%20Russian%20battalion%20tactical%20group%20%28BTG%29%20is%20a,firepower%2C%20electronic%20warfare%20%28EW%29%20and%20air-defense%20artillery%20%28ADA%29.

[3] Lester Grau and Jacob X. Kipp, “Urban Combat: Confronting the Spector,” Military Review, Ft Leavenworth, KS: July-August 1999.

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