War in the Pacific: Were These Islands Necessary? Saipan, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa

 

WAR IN THE PACIFIC


Were these four islands necessary? Were there any measures available that could have prevented the high casualties? Why were these islands selected?

 

SAIPAN 

Saipan was selected due to its strategic position along the Mariannas island chain. The island gave a tremendous boost to the reach of allied (U.S.) aircraft. It would eventually (about four months after its capture) be used as an important B-29 bomber airfield that allowed B-29’s to reach the Japanese home islands. Of those who both fought for it, and defended it, all agreed as to the islands strategic importance and meaning:

 

“Holland Smith declared it "the decisive battle of the Pacific offensive" for it "opened the way to the home islands." Japanese General Saito had written that "the fate of the Empire will be decided in this one action." A Japanese admiral agreed, "Our war was lost with the loss of Saipan" It had truly been a "strategic strike" for the United States.”[1]

 

 PELELIU

The debacle that Peleliu turned out to be can be attributed to first, the desire of General Douglas MacArthur to have his ‘right flank’ protected as he triumphantly returned to the Philippines and second, (once again) to just awful intelligence. The fight would indeed be of the most brutal sort with incredible casualties experienced by the hardened 1st Marine Division veterans of Guadalcanal.

 The naval bombardment and the aerial attacks conducted by the carrier airwings rendered the island’s airfields destroyed. And perhaps, the island, like others, should have been bypassed. But the amphibious assault continued. “Aided by the rugged terrain, their careful preparation, and new tactics, the Japanese would inflict more than twice as many casualties on the Marines on Peleliu as they had on Tarawa. Proportionally, Marine casualties on Peleliu equaled those suffered on Iwo Jima.”[2]

 Admiral Nimitz turned down Admiral Halsey’s proposal to bypass the Palau islands. The timing had much to do with the decision to take Peleliu. “[The] Americans were overconfident after so many successes and Major General William Rupertus of the First Marine Division forecast victory in four days.”[3]

It appears that not only bad intelligence furnished the Peleliu operation but the hubris of the commanders involved. Historiography of the battle indicates Peleliu as the absolute worst Battle in the Pacific (claimed by the Marine Corps Historical Society) and to only add to the debate? The island and its airfields played no part in future operations.


IWO JIMA

Iwo Jima provided not only an airfield where fighter escorts could operate out off, but an alternate airfield to recover the expensive B-29s as they bombed the home islands. The B-29 could carry either 5,000lbs of bombs at high altitude for 1,400 miles or 12,000lbs for 1,400 miles at medium altitude. A round trip from the very northern end of the Philippines, for example, was just over 3,000 miles. Fuel consumption, altitudes taken, the heavy winds at high altitude over Japan proper and of course, the enemy all had a vote as to the operational effectiveness of the B-29. Iwo Jima, along with the Marianas islands all served one purpose: allow staging airfields to fully support massive strategic bombing raids in order to reduce the Japanese military industrial capacity and ability to govern.

The bloody fight for Iwo Jima, albeit difficult to understand for the millions of Americans back home, was a necessity for the eventual surrender of Japan.

 

 OKINAWA 

Given the assumption that nuclear weapons would contribute nothing to victory, the battle of Okinawa had to be fought.”[4] The leadership in Washington and across the Pacific had to continue combat operations in the Pacific against Japan in order to close on the home islands. And Okinawa would be a major prize in preparation for the planned invasion of Kyshu Island, the southern most of the home islands.

Okinawa saw both the U.S. Marines and the U.S. Army commit the largest numbers of combatants to date. In addition, the Japanese began its most desperate defense using ‘kamikaze’ suicide attack aircraft in exceedingly large numbers. In addition, the largest IJN battleships were also committed to the desperate defense.

 The eventual seizure of the Okinawa Island provided unfettered ability to launch aerial attacks against the home islands in the ever tightening noose that would surround Japan in her final defense.


SUMMARY

It is interesting that the amount of criticism of any particular battle increases correspondingly with the number of casualties incurred. The geography of the Pacific and of Japan proper, necessitated occupation of Japanese held possessions at some point in space and time. Further, the ultimate surrender of the Japanese would still require the ability of the U.S. and her Allies to put Soldiers and Marines with weapons, on the ground and in harms way. It can be imagined now that if Tojo had succeeded in assembling a coup against the Emperor, an invasion of the Japanese home islands would obviously had to have been undertaken. And if that had been the case, the casualties suffered would have eclipsed Saipan, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa combined.

 

 

 



[1] Chapin, John C., “BREACHING THE MARIANAS: The Battle for Saipan”, Marines in World War II Commemorative Series, National Park Service, https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/npswapa/extcontent/usmc/pcn-190-003123-00/sec9.htm accessed on 4 June 2018

[2] McGrath,Roger D., “All For Naught: The Battle of Peleliu”, The New American, April, 2010, https://www.thenewamerican.com/component/k2/item/4700-all-for-naught-the-battle-of-peleliu accessed on 4 June 2018

[3] Van der Vat, Dan, The Pacific Campaign: World War II, The U.S.-Japanese Naval War 1941-1945, Simon&Schuster, New York, 1991, p. 347

[4] Manchester, William, “The Bloodiest Battle of All,” The New York Times, 14 June, 1987, https://www.nytimes.com/1987/06/14/magazine/the-bloodiest-battle-of-all.html accessed on 4 June 2018


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