Hypothetical Planning 1943: The Central or Southern Pacific Axis?
Hypothetical
Planning 1943: The Central or Southern Pacific Axis?
TASK
By 1943 two different viewpoints had emerged on how to
win the war.
1. One,
an island-hopping strategy across the Central Pacific, utilizing American air
and naval strength and few ground troops, was advocated by Admiral Nimitz.
2. On
the other hand, General Douglas MacArthur believed, mostly for personal
reasons, that a drive through the Philippines would be best to bring about the
final defeat of Japan.
Select one of the opposing points of view and brief the
Commander-In-Chief, President Roosevelt.
INTRODUCTION
The provocative and
aggressive actions by Japan in the Far East, necessitates a thorough review and
redesign of current war plans. Understanding the requirements of the President
with respect to the Atlantic and our key ally, the United Kingdom, a review of
the Pacific strategy is proposed in order to defend current possessions in the
Pacific and to transition to the offensive against Japan.
The American-British
Conferences (ABC) established that ‘if and when’ the United States enters the
war in Europe, that the U.S would quickly assume primary responsibility for
prosecuting a strategy and subsequent campaigns against Germany while
simultaneously prosecuting a war against Japan. The ABC-1 discussions revealed
that “no agreement on plans for British-American collaboration in the Pacific,
comparable to those for the Atlantic, based on ABC-1, was reached.”[1]
The current set of war plans addressing the Pacific and
Japan has highlighted several critical factors that will shape future strategic
and operational approaches. Pre-War planners “had finally concluded that Japan
could be defeated only in a long, costly war, in which the Philippines would
early be lost, and in which American offensive operations would take the form
of a "progressive movement" through the mandated islands, beginning
with the Marshalls and Carolines, to establish "a secure line of
communications to the Western Pacific."[2]
Japanese woodblock print postcard.
1943: Celebrating Pearl Harbor.
RECOMMENDATION
Given the pre-war
planning, the current commitments in Europe and with cooperation of our Allies
it is highly recommended that the United States strategy in the Pacific be
focused on an axis of advance via the Central Pacific islands. The end state
objective is the capitulation of Japan forced by the destruction of war making
industries, collapse of government communications, ability to command and
ability to control continued military operations. Key tasks strategically, will
concentrate on seizing key islands along the Central Pacific axis that either
assist continued movement towards the Japanese home islands or, provide
critical logistics nodes in order to sustain the campaign. The final seizure of
key islands will be based on the specific ability, geographically, to fully
support strategic aerial bombing of Japanese infrastructure. A naval blockade
utilizing subsurface (submarine) fleet will be implemented from the Japanese
home islands and extend towards the Southern Pacific in order to deny raw
material and petroleum resupply of the Imperial Japanese Navy and Army forces.
BACKGROUND
In the pre-war years,
particularly in the 1930’s, Joint Staff planners had ultimately proposed a
‘defensive’ approach to the Pacific. There was a mutual understanding across
both the Army and Navy staffs that the United Kingdom, facing down the threat
of Germany in Europe, would not possess the strength in the South and Western
pacific to safeguard her dominions. The threat that Japan posed stretched from
Cam Ran Bay, Vietnam to Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and the Dutch East Indies.
Thus, the whole of the South Pacific was threatened and presented a most precarious
situation with respect to Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines.
The inter-war years
between 1919 and 1940 saw numerous proposals and draft war plans, ‘the Rainbow
Plans,’ that assigned colors to specific plans and theaters. The Joint Staff
and various War Planning groups almost universally believed in the principle of
the defensive in deterring the Japanese ambitions in the Pacific. A glooming
prospect, however, was the inability to defend the Philippines. The ‘Orange War
plan’, “officially adopted in 1924, made no mention of the predictable plight
of the Philippines.”[3]
Actions by the Japanese
in late autumn and early winter of 1941 reshaped the disposition of allied
forces and critically jeopardized all but one of the pre-war plans of the Joint
Staff. The Japanese, with rapidity, seized European dominions of the Dutch East
Indies, Singapore, and Hong Kong. The aggressive expansion of the ‘Greater East
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’ has also seen the assault on the Philippines and
occupation of the Korean Peninsula and the island of Formosa. In addition, the
Japanese have expanded operations throughout Indochina and in to Burma as well
as New Guinea and other islands across the Southern and Central Pacific. That
this came as a shock, is an understatement however, the rapid expansion by the
Japanese has had several negative and unintended effects that work in the
positive for the U.S.
The Japanese have, in
essence, expanded their own holdings from Burma to Guam and from Manchuria to
the Marshall Islands. But, this expansion has also limited their ability to
mass combat power, increased their burdens to logistically support, and over extended
their security commitments. This, then, is the key to their undoing.
CURRENT JAPANESE
DISPOSITION OF FORCES
Figure
1: Asia and the Pacific - The
Japanese Plan and Troop Disposition, November 1941[4]
Current intelligence estimates places no less than three Armies arrayed in Manchuria (‘Kwantung Army’), the China Expeditionary Army (‘CEA’) in China proper, and an Army in Korea (‘Korean Army’). The Southern Army includes forces in the Philippines, Thailand, the East Indies, and Malaya.
CONCEPT AND APPROACH
Analysis of the vast
Pacific area and the disposition of the Imperial Japanese forces throughout,
obviates a maritime strategy as the dominate approach with the Naval service
primarily tasked in prosecution of war with Japan. Japan, an island nation,
surrounded by seas, can only be defeated by severing her sea lines of
communication. As overextended as Japan has become, her defeat will rely on
maritime power.
The recommended Central
Pacific campaign strategy contains three principled phases.
1.
“In Phase I American soldiers marooned in
the Philippines would fight a sacrificial delaying action on fortress positions
at the mouth of Manila Bay.”[5] The Pacific Fleet would
operate in the warm waters of the Central Pacific.
2.
Phase II would see the central Pacific
drive thrust towards Micronesia, Marshall and Caroline islands and see the
thrust back towards the Philippines.
3.
Phase III would see the seizure of the
Okinawa islands and the isolation of Japan. “Blockade and bombardment would
compel it to surrender in due course.”[6] The campaign plans along
the central Pacific axis would be determined by geography. Certain islands
would be bypassed and others, should analysis determine their support of logistics
or air operations, be invested.
PHASE I
The U.S. Pacific Fleet,
headquartered in Pearl Harbor Hawaii, will assemble and engage the Japanese
possessions along the periphery of the central Pacific. The U.S. Army, in the
Philippines, will fight a delaying action as long as possible. Only when naval
combat power is strong enough, will they be unleashed along the central
Pacific. This phase will unfold with the Japanese in the offensive, and thus,
owning the initiative.
PHASE II
The main principles
associated with the central Pacific strategy include flexibility, mutual
support, and initiative. The central Pacific drive will be offensive as Phase
II sees the shift from a delaying and defensive nature to amphibious assault
operations. Specific islands will be targeted and invested by concentrating fleet
forces and amphibious forces along specific targets selected for their
potential to support continued offensive operations or expansion of logistics
and sustainment support. Fleet action will seek to destroy any Imperial
Japanese Navy forces that contest the central Pacific drive. This phase,
however, by its nature and in anticipation of the Japanese contest of the
central Pacific waters, will see the most challenges. Major problems exist,
post analysis of geography, distances from support bases, and disposition of
Japanese forces.
“The correct solution of
the Phase II problem, proposed in some of the earliest Orange Plans by a few
talented officers, was to advance step-by-step across the Pacific, by way of
mobile bases set up on intermediate islands.”[7] It is anticipated,
however, that somewhere, within Phase II, a decisive naval battle or a series
of them would occur as the Japanese would indeed seek it and moreover, they
will contest the U.S. Pacific fleet as she drives along further west deeper
into the Pacific waters towards the Japanese home islands.
PHASE III
“In the wars third phase,
Japan’s insularity would prove fatal.”[8] The final phase would see
the choking off of all resources and war material to the Japanese home islands
with the implementation of a naval blockade. The total destruction of the IJN
surface fleet during Phase I would allow freedom of operations in all seas the
surround the Japanese home islands. Strategic aerial bombardment would continue
against targets the length and breadth of the home islands as well. Complete
destruction of Japanese industry, government, and military facilities would be
undertaken until Japan sued for peace and surrendered.
STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES
The strategic objective
of the central Pacific campaign is nothing short of the destruction of Imperial
Japanese forces and capitulation of the Imperial Japanese government.
Phase I includes the
holding and delaying of further Japanese offensives in the Philippines and
other U.S. possessions to include Guam, Wake, Midway, and the Hawaiian islands.
Essentially trading space for time in order to rapidly build up the maximum
amount of combat power (mass) in the Pacific will set conditions for transition
to the offensive in Phase II. It is anticipated that the Japanese disposition
of forces across the Pacific will negate the power of the Japanese Army. At no single
location, aside from the mainland of China, will the Japanese be able to outnumber
U.S. forces once the country has been mobilized and placed on a total war
footing.
General
MacArthur, President Roosevelt, and Admiral Nimitz.
Supporting and shaping
campaigns will be conducted as an ‘economy of force’ effort in order to
maintain the maximum amount of mass at decisive points along the axis of attack
(central Pacific Island chain). Offensive campaigns and operations will serve
to keep the Japanese off balance. Maneuver along the central Pacific axis does
not necessitate seizing and holding every island along the chain. Rather, with
the initiative, only islands that offer necessary support (logistics and
staging bases and/or airfields) will be selected. Other islands will be used for
‘deception operations’ with feints in mind in order to keep the Japanese off
balance or continuously over extending due to security concerns.
Security must be
maintained between the Hawaiian Islands westward as the central Pacific drive
thrusts along the island chain. Shaping
and supporting operations will be executed in order to achieve surprise on
objectives of the main effort.
Subsurface or submarine
forces, will be applied along the Japanese internal lines of communications
(LOCs) with the express purpose of severing their LOCs used for sustaining
their economy and industrial capacity. Main effort combat power will be
comprised of aircraft carriers, carrier air wings, and associated surface
forces. Amphibious forces will be formed and comprised of surface forces and
U.S. Marine Corps landing forces.
Surprise will be achieved
by seizing the initiative, striking where least expected, and when supporting
and shaping forces have conducted feint operations. The central Pacific strategy
must remain focused, synchronized, coordinated, include mutual support and most
importantly, provide simple objectives and associated key tasks to commanders.
It is recommended that
unity of command be retained by CINCUS (COMINCH) out of Pearl Harbor. Areas of
responsibility will be established and based on either geography or task.
Admiral
Spruance and Admiral Nimitz.
ASSUMPTIONS
Key assumptions: the United States industrial capacity
will be placed on a national war footing with production goals established to
support our Allies (‘Lend Lease’) and both the European and Pacific Theaters.
Manufacturing of critical and key equipment, essential to the conduct of
military combat operations and campaigns will be established to include
shipyard production, maintenance and repair. Priority equipment for the Pacific
campaign will include aircraft carriers, aircraft, surface vessels, and
submarines. Particular attention will be placed on expanding current and emerging
technologies with respect to radar, communications equipment and engines
(aircraft and vessels).
A general nationwide
mobilization of manpower for industrial and military service will be undertaken
in addition with a focus on the expansion of the naval services (U.S. Navy,
U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard) as well as the Merchant Marine. The
Marine Corps will be expanded to a multi-division organization capable of
executing the amphibious assaults envisioned in the central Pacific strategy.
Politically and
diplomatically, key allies will contribute forces to the Pacific that will
cooperate under the direction of CINCUS (COMINCH). Further, CINCUS (COMINCH)
will have the freedom and autonomy to prosecute the central Pacific strategy by
direction of the Joint Staff.
ALTERNATE APPROACHES
The geography and
disposition of Japanese forces (to include anticipated disposition of Japanese
forces) requires holding key territories and possessions for as long as
possible in order to place the U.S. Pacific forces on a complete war footing.
The recommendation of the central Pacific strategy, or ‘island hopping,’
ensures that security and a logistics infrastructure is developed in order to
fully support progress towards the Japanese home islands. Post Pearl Harbor damage
assessment reports current inability to either go on to the offensive or
reinforce the Philippines. Critical logistics and communications routes must be
established from the West coast of the U.S. to Hawaii to Australia-New Zealand
along the southern Pacific.
Admiral Nimitz;
Lieutenant General Delos C. Emmons, U.S. Army; Vice Admiral Frank Jack
Fletcher, USN; Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, USN and Lieutenant General Simon
Bolivar Buckner, U.S. Army.
Should sufficient combat
power be developed, Australia and New Zealand could provide jumping off points
to operations and campaigns across the southern Pacific axis. Should Borneo,
Indonesia, New Guinea be seized, they could, in turn, then support continued
axis of advance to the Philippines and Formosa.
It is recommended that
the Southern and Southwestern Pacific be invested and utilized as a ‘supporting’
front for the main effort; the Central Pacific. It would be
extraordinarily difficult to establish the main effort from the South Western
Pacific owing to the long lines of communications, the inability to ensure
their security, and the ability of the Japanese to concentrate more of her air,
naval, and land power along this axis in defense.
Admiral
Nimitz, Admiral King, and Admiral Spruance.
SUMMARY
The recommended strategy
for war with Japan is one where U.S. Naval forces, exercising overall command
and control, conduct attacks and amphibious assaults on key islands across the
central Pacific Island chain. Target islands will be selected for their ability
to support logistics and airfields. Islands will be bypassed should they prove
disadvantageous or, unsupportable. U.S.
forces will seek to advance towards the Japanese home islands in order to
defeat and destroy Imperial Japanese forces. Once key islands, within aerial
range of strategic bombers has been secured, the Japanese home islands will be
blockaded by naval subsurface and surface forces and attacked by carrier
aircraft and strategic bombers.
The central Pacific
strategy has three phases; Phase I defend and delay in the Philippines, with
limited attacks against Imperial Japanese Navy possessions on the outer edge of
their ‘Co-Prosperity Sphere. Phase II
includes amphibious assault and seizure of key islands along the central Pacific
Island chain axis, and finally, Phase III. The focus of phase III includes the
amphibious assault of the Okinawa Island chain and the establishment of
airfields for the blockade and strategic bombardment of the Japanese industrial
and military war making infrastructure of the home islands.
Deception, surprise,
security of internal lines of communication and mutually supporting and/or
shaping campaigns across the Southern and Southwestern Pacific will ensure the
success of the central Pacific strategy.
WORKS CITED
[1] Matloff, Maurice, Prewar Military
Plans and Preparations, 1939 – 1941, Proceedings
Magazine, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, July, 1953 Vol 79/7/605, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1953-07/prewar-military-plans-and-preparations-1939-1941, accessed on 1 June 2018.
[2] Matloff,
Maurice and Snell, Edwin M., Strategic Planning For
Coalition Warfare
1941-1942,
Center
Of Military History United States Army Washington, D. C., 1990, https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/SP1941-42/index.htm#Contents
accessed on 1 June 2018.
[3] Spector, Ronald H., “Eagle Against the Sun”, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2012, 56.
[4] Bailey, Jennifer L.Map, Asia and the Pacific - The Japanese Plan and Troop Disposition, November 1941, From the Philippines Campaign Brochure, University of Texas at Austin, Perry-Castañeda Library, World War II Map Collection, https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/asia_1941.jpg accessed on June 2018.
[5] Miller, Edward, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945, Naval Institute Press, Dec 13, 2013, 20.
[6] Ibid, 20.
[7] Ibid, 40.
[8] Ibid, 41.
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